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8 February 1980

West Europe Report

(FOUO 7/80)



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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

UDF DEPUTY'S RECEPTION BY KHOMEYNI RECOUNTED

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 31 Dec 79 p 20

[Interview with Dr Nicolas About, deputy from Neauphle-le-Chateau, after his return from a visit to Ayatollah Khomeyni in Iran, by Michel Chamard, of VALEURS ACTUELLES, on 26 December 1979, in Paris]

[Text] A UDF [French Democratic Union] deputy. He was received by Ayatollah Khomeyni. "In very good form."

"The deputy from Neauphle on a visit to Iran." That is how Dr Nicolas About summed up his trip to Teheran. He returned as a delegate to Ayatollah Khomeyni. Thirty-two years old, with keen eyes under metal-rimmed eyeglasses, About is looked upon as one of the promising men of the UDF.

Neauphle-le-Chateau, the village where the ayatollah took refuge during his exile in France, is part of his constituency. Dr About had become acquainted with the son of the ayatollah and his entire team. He again met with them at the Iranian revolutionary council.

He did not go alone. Another pro-Giscard deputy, Pierre Bourson, and Brigitte Gros, a radical senator, accompanied him. They did not want to meet with the "students" who occupy the American embassy, in order not "to humble themselves before captors of hostages." But they made other contacts with members of the revolutionary council.

[Dr About] "They pledged that they would obtain some releases by Christmas. They came to our hotel at 0200 hours to tell us that there would be three."

However, on 26 December, the day of our talk in his office at the National Assembly, Dr About admitted that nothing had happened.

[Dr About] "I am in constant telephone contact with Teheran," he said. "I have just been told that the climate is thawing."

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[Chamard] And the hostages transferred to prison?

[Dr About] "That's a good sign," he said quietly. "It is even a masterful stroke. That they were able to leave the embassy constitutes success for the revolutionary council. Because it is considerable progress to obtain something from the 'students.'"

Several minutes later, Dr About explained that, when the French delegation was received by Imam Khomeyni, the latter said "that he did not have anything against the hostages, but that he wanted to expose American methods." In short, he accepts full responsibility for the events.

[Dr About] "I am sure that there will be some partial releases," continued the deputy from Neauphle. "A matter of days. In the case of the others, it will be before the end of January. One cannot conceive of the presidential elections that are to take place in Iran with such a case not being closed."

The reasoning of a Parisian parliamentarian. Many other cases were to remain open, in spite of the elections--for example, the Kurdish secession, the dissidence of Ayatollah Chadriath Madari, and the unemployment that affects at least 4 million persons.

[Dr About] "In a year or 2," according to Dr About's estimate, "the religious aspect of the Iranian revolution will become less important. People will choose between a Mossadegh-type liberal option and a Marxist option. The Toudeh Iranian PC [Communist Party], which is portrayed as negligible, seemed very well implanted. Many people say they are members."

The parliamentarians met with the imam on Saturday, 22 December.

[Dr About] "The latter," said Dr About, "values his image as father of his people."

"I found him in great form for an 80-year old man. I say that as a doctor. Imam Khomeyni emphasized that he would never forget France's welcome, which made it possible for him to carry out his activity with respect to the liberation of Iran."

About explained that French Ambassador Delaine is very active and that a great climate of friendship toward our country prevails in Teheran:

[Dr About] "The Iranians are ready to sign new contracts."

[Chamard] "Why were those that had been signed with France before the revolution suspended or cancelled when those that had been concluded with capitalist countries like Japan were honored?"

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[Dr About] "They wanted a respite," said Dr About. "The only real problem is that the new regime refuses to pay the debts of the preceding one."

Dr About added that the French in Iran live in complete safety:

"With the exception of the United States embassy, Islam is very respectful of foreigners and assures the protection of its guests."

[Chamard] When I pointed out to him that the Quai d'Orsay had begun to discreetly repatriate the families of the cooperators [young volunteers who perform civilian service in certain foreign countries for the duration of their military obligation], the deputy replied:

[Dr About] "No; they were only encouraged to spend Christmas in France."

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

KONOPNICKI VIEWS MARCHAIS' 'STALINIZATION' OF PCF

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 79 pp 64-65

[Article by Guy Konopnicki: "Same Tactic Followed by Marchais-Stalin: Elimination of Spoil-Sports"]

[Text] Guy Konopnicki, a journalist, is a former leader of the Communist Students Union, and former contributor to FRANCE NOUVELLE. He is the author of the humorous pamphlet "Long Live the Centennial of the French Communist Party." His next book, to be published soon, will be entitled "Au Chic Ouvrier" [The Chic Worker].

As everyone knows, there is total unity within the communist party and, these days, insults are hitting below the belt. Jean Elleinstein compares the leaders to the various members of a government which is to Czechoslovakia what Vichy was to France. Georges Marchais answers with the finesse and distinction we have become accustomed to in the course of political debates: Those who dare speak of restalinization of the PCF [French Communist Party] are simply imbeciles. As an imbecile, I yield to Georges Marchais. In fact, one cannot "restalinize" a party which has never been really "destalinized." Let us even say that, looking at the present face of communism, a number of old members sigh, thinking that changing the cult of Stalin and Maurice Thorez for that of Georges Marchais seems decadent. At least the old ones had panache! Furthermore, in France, where Stalinism was not in power, it had its own grotesque, flowery, amusing side. There were portraits, poems, songs, there was the expression of "comrade miner," and beautiful rolling statements of the "unbreakable attachment of the working class and the people of France to the great proletarian party, to the glorious Soviet Union, led by the person we no longer love, the brilliant heir to the great Lenin, the supreme guide of the world proletariat, in a word, Joseph Vissiarionovich Stalin." All this had a surrealist, absurd side. The members zealously chanted, "Comrades, let us drink to Maurice's health." The dissidents were not "imbeciles" but lewd vipers, traitors subsidized by imperialism

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and Hitler-Trotskyites. Socialists were not turning to the right but were bought by the Pentagon. This folklore has disappeared and, since then, there has been boredom within the PCF except, naturally, when an alliance with the social traitors offers the possibility to improve on the sad French political life. However, the base of Stalinism has remained. It has simply developed into the frightening technocratic vocabulary of Giscardian France. Thus, the USSR is no longer the shining fatherland of socialism. It is merely showing a "positive balance," like a vulgar company listed on the stock market. The literary reviews in L'HUMANITE are no longer signed by Andre Stil, Stalin prize, but Andre Stil, of the Goncourt Academy. The dog Pif is probably bored stiff in a newspaper where he no longer steadily comes across the lying dogs of imperialism and reaction.

Two Nominated Winners

However, the cult of personality has developed quite actively in favor of Georges Marchais who is cited extensively every day. Poor Marchais, who cannot be the recipient of the hyperbolic praise he heaped on Thorez in the past as he opened for him the door of his automobile. Finally, the secretary general of the PCF is nothing more than one television star among others, sunk in impossible contradictions. Here is an example: Try to imagine yourself at the microphone of France Inter or of Europe 1, blaming your opposition for using the "bourgeois press" under the pretext that they were given access to half a column of an evening daily. Or else, see yourself as pretending to throw a daily fit against a journalist who has been offering you the microphone and the camera every week for the past three years, who, in a way, becomes intimate? Imagine trying to explain that L'HUMANITE is better than television, when the entire purpose of this unfortunate newspaper is to repeat what you said the previous evening on Channel 2. Even worse, it will be necessary to explain over a two-year period that Georges Marchais would be the best candidate to oppose Giscard! Even though it is clear that the Elysee Palace has never been more at ease with such a candidacy! . . . It would be proper for VGE [Valery Giscard d'Estaing] to be generous and give good Georges a small gift to ensure his own reelection in advance. The more so since both of them dream of one thing: to face each other during the second balloting round, which would make it possible for the outgoing president to garner a good 60 percent of the vote and the communist candidate to garner 35, for the first time in the history of the party, meanwhile dealing a mortal blow at the Socialist Party. In different circumstances--with the Socialist Party leading--one would be satisfied with the traditional 20 percent, sending Mitterrand or Rocard to the slaughterhouse and hope for the subsequent blowup of the Socialist Party. In a word, it will be necessary to shout for almost two years the fact that the Communist Party is attacking the right, while the two winners of 1981, Marchais and Giscard, have already been named. This is the best possible show. The only real yet substantial problem for the occupant of Place du Colonel Fabien is the following: The first to sense the circus and not like this

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at all are. . . the communists. For the past two years the secretary general has been doing everything possible to make them swallow that pill. The leaders remain firm: Piquet and Leroy are no longer members of the secretariat. The members are leaving the cells. All this is taking place discreetly. The intellectuals are rumbling. This makes a little bit of noise but the party has seen worse. Then, Henri Fiszbin, the secretary of the Paris federation, officially resigned for health reasons, reveals that he had been sentenced by the leadership. Then, suddenly, we learn that that famous unanimity existing around Marchais is nothing but a big joke. The Parisian membership begins to grumble again and in some sections resolutions are even put to a vote, which, to say the least, is unusual! The leadership must face an opposition encouraged by old leaders who, however, were for many years the faithful transmission belts. At this point, Henri Fiszbin's companions are living in an upside down world. At least two of them, Jean Gajer and Georges Heckli, had actively participated in the hunt for "deviationists" and "leftists" in the 1960's. Yet, usually, the member of the opposition is either a young member repelled by the apparatus or an intellectual who punctually shows his differences at each political turn. Yet, at this point, it is the old loyalists who begin to object. Furthermore, they include in Paris, a substantial number of "permanents" who have not feared loss of jobs at the age of 50, yet, the entire political system of the party is based on these 15,000 "permanents" who literally depend on the party, for they have made a total break with their professional careers! The machine itself is running hot! Marchais's answering tactic is to let the spoilsports go. This then is the great opening for the communists: In order to preserve the leadership of the party, all that it takes is to change members. Traditional communists are kicked out, the new members support Marchais, and the trick is played. This may seem quite unlike restalinization. Yet, it is not, it is Stalinization in full: It is precisely the way Stalin proceeded to secure for himself in the 1920's the control of the CPSU, by eliminating its members. The latter, veteran bolsheviks, had faced the Czar, Kerenskiy and the civil war. Such people have never liked to submit. After 10 years not one of them remained within the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party. The party has retained the name but its supporters are no longer the same. However, Stalin had the final arguments which Marchais lacks: jail, exile, and assassination as methods of intimidation.

For this reason, the communist party leadership must introduce innovations. Its method is deafness. Raise a storm of criticism, shout even. . . there will be no answer. To be able to withstand in such a situation, opposing an omnipotent apparatus, one needs to be in perfect health and have time to lose. It is the kingdom of absurdity. It is great theater! Do the members want to speak of the union of the left? They are presented with an old discussion on morality or homosexuality. Any relation? None: The game is always to speak of something else. This is a real hide and seek game that has been going on for the past two

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years, with its high points. Following the 1978 elections the members wanted to analyze the results. L'HUMANITE spoke to them of the black tide in Brittany which, naturally, was an important problem. . . In November 1978 the violent anti-Semitic broke out in the USSR. The party responded with a daring criticism of crimes committed 30 years ago. This becomes an unreal world in which one may lose one's mind! This goes on. The Kampuchean drama? The party plunges into a laborious evaluation of the achievements of the socialist system over the past 60 years. Facing the membership, the frozen leaders and the leadership pour out meaningless and absurd speeches, answering questions with prepared sentences. Their key statement is, "The problem lies elsewhere, your concept of reality is misshapen." No one knows at what point Henri Fiszbin's vision became twisted to such a point as to note that the balance of the USSR was not particularly positive and that the PCF was entirely overwhelmed by feminist or youth anticonformist movements! However, no one will have the possibility to discuss this matter in a truly thorough fashion, and no one within the PCF will admit that Henri Fiszbin's real fault was to have disputed Georges Marchais's primacy in the 1977 municipal elections campaign.

Everyone is Cold

Henri Fiszbin himself is still saying nothing on the meetings of the central committee and even on the one in the course of which, it is said, he may have opposed the breakup of the union of the left. Each meeting begins with an introduction report in which the really important points in the labyrinth of commonplace occurrences are singled out. The game is complex. To describe it in simple terms I shall make an easily understandable comparison: You live in a condominium. The central heating breaks down. The manager calls a meeting of the co-owners and submits a long report on the elevator which works perfectly. You try to speak of the central heating. The manager answer you that what is on the agenda is the elevator. Finally, you manage to say that the heating has broken down. You are then told that this is an error, and that the newspapers are lying. You say, but this is at home, I am cold. At this point you are asked if you work at the plant. No? That is really why you are cold. In the best of cases there is a general cry of indignation. Everyone is cold. The manager acknowledges it and closes down the meeting by saying that "problems do exist but we are working to resolve them." You come out pleased. . . Months pass and no one has repaired the heating. A new meeting is held, and so on. This is more or less the way discussions are held at the PCF! Since a party membership card is not an apartment, the members eventually leave. This should worry the leadership. Yet, it does not in the least, that is what it is looking for, it recruits new members and everything starts all over again, and so on. To cap it all, the old PCF members are continuing for the party. But that is not all for the men cast of bronze have absolutely unbeatable arguments. Do you what was their answer to my parable of the meeting of the co-owners? That I am a petit bourgeois who owns an apartment. Yet, were I to answer that I have chosen a random example, that I am renting my apartment, I

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would be told that this is clear proof that I do not understand anything as far as meetings of condominium owners are concerned. After some such treatment L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE would perform an essential function: It would tell you that the day of your cell meeting is precisely when the television is showing an interesting film. Just before the film, you turn to Marchais who, precisely that day, tells you three obvious things dealing with a crisis, unemployment, and inflation. Your conscience begins to bother you and you tell yourself that, of course, attending your cell meeting around the corner is horrifying but then, nevertheless, Marchais is defending the workers and, therefore, you go on voting. The morality is that the party has lost a bothersome member but retained a voter. As long as this game is played the political situation cannot change and the power will not switch hands. Therefore, the only thing which could change this absurd situation is for it to give up. Yet, this may last a long, long time, like something that wears out, unless social events disturb the game. Yet, since in such matters no one could predict the unpredictable, Georges Marchais may go on with his televised sketch, seeing the future in rosy colors. All the way to 1981. . . .

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW WITH PIERRE FEUILLY ON CGT-CFDT ACCORD

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 26 Nov-2 Dec 79 p 51

[Interview of Pierre Feully, member of the CGT executive commission, by Claude-Francois Jullien: "The CGT Socialists Counterattack"; place and date not given. Additional information on this subject appears in JPRS 74983, 23 January 1980, No 1531 of this series, pp 97-104]

[Text] Stirrings continue within the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]. Two members of the Socialist Party, who are also members of the CGT executive commission, Pierre Carassus and Pierre Feully, gave an interview to their Party's weekly, L'UNITE (in the issue of Friday 16 November) to denounce PCF interference in the CGT. On Saturday 17 November, Charles Fiterman challenged Pierre Feully to prove it. On 18 November, Feully sent a letter to Roland Leroy, editor of L'HUMANITE. On Thursday 22 November, the Communist daily published a declaration from the CGT's Paris departmental union, which disavowed the two Socialists, and in an unsigned notice said, "Pierre Feully's answer follows," but did not quote him. We asked Pierre Feully to answer in our magazine.

[Question] How do you, Pierre Feully, react to the CGT's Paris departmental union's criticizing you?

[Answer] I became aware of this disapproval when I read L'HUMANITE on Thursday morning. I am surprised at this statement, which criticizes two party members who are officers in the CGT. Indeed, our interview in no way criticized the CGT, only the PCF's repeated interference in our organization, in union actions, and in the interunion debate before and after the CGT-CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] accord of 17 September. So the CGT should certainly not have felt that we were attacking it.

[Question] Charles Fiterman and L'HUMANITE say you were telling stories. Do you have proof of PCF interference?

[Answer] Obviously. But first let me repeat that we emphasize in the interview that the CGT has been able to remain independent of political parties, and especially the PCF, if only in the Boulin affair. So I sent a reply to

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L'HUMANITE when Fiterman made his accusations. Here is what I said:

(1) At the Central Committee meeting of 12 September, in the midst of difficult negotiations between the CGT and the CFDT, Georges Marchais said that Edmond Maire had "basically accepted austerity and layoffs in the name of realism."

(2) On 29 September, after officially taking credit for the agreement, the PCF found a pretext in the statements of Valery Giscard d'Estaing to put a headline on the front page of L'HUMANITE: "Giscard and Maire Are Hooked Up." And Maire was accused of "aiding" a "political operation."

(3) Jacques Chereque was accused by L'HUMANITE on 11 October of having compromised himself in a seminar with "management people." The PCF newspaper just forgot to mention that Communist Senator Anicet Le Pors took part in the same colloquium.

How can Charles Fiterman and Roland Leroy have us believe that these attacks on the CFDT, which are intended to discredit CGT leaders among PCF members, have no effect on PCF members of the CGT?

[Question] But on what text do you base your denunciation of PCF interference in the CGT?

[Answer] I will cite only one, but it is revealing. At Place Colonel Fabien on 13 September, Pierre Juquin declared, "I am happy that the influence of Communist members has increased within the CGT." It is clear indeed that for the PCF, which has put the union of the left back on the shelf, it is vital that its ideas spread within the largest group of unions, and the PCF is moving in this direction. So much the worse for the CGT's independence and the workers' hopes for unity.

[Question] Did the CGT office react?

[Answer] No. I would know. I don't see why it would have reacted, because our interview was in no way critical of the CGT; quite to the contrary.

But I do want to conclude by emphasizing the new "self-managing" character of the PCF, which refused to publish my reply. Wasn't it precisely because my letter contained factual evidence that L'HUMANITE did not want its readers to know?

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF'S STALINISTS SEEN 'REJOICING' OVER NEW SITUATION

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 25 Jan 80 pp 46-47

[Article by Michel Gonod]

[Text] It looked like a politics fiction movie. Yves Mourousi and Patrice Duhamel were standing before a large screen, their back to the camera. A gigantic Marchais loomed on the screen, the picture slightly blurred due to its being transmitted via satellite. With his size, he seemed to tower over the journalists who looked as though they were rooted at the foot of this vision coming from afar through sidereal space. The first moment of surprise over, one was gripped by the strength of Marchais' text. He was speaking from the height of his muscovite Olympus to two small earthworms, bestowing much honor upon them by pretending to answer their timidly voiced questions. It was a caricature of an interview; a parody of a dialog; a pastiche of Marais' relationships with the press. On one side stood the communist leader with raised fist and clenched jaws, his face a tragic mask, insults on the ready; on the other, two mirthful journalists turning toward the camera as though checking to see if the televiewers were following this clownish performance being offered to them. They laughed, not knowing that they were living a historical moment in our political life, for what the PCF secretary general was saying was serious: he was explaining the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to uphold it. He was justifying it better than the Soviets themselves had done until then. He used it to condemn all those who did not agree with him: Americans; CIA; "Giscardian power;" the Voice of America; Francois Mitterand and his "little flunkey," Pierre Joxe, whom he called a whipper-snapper for daring to send him a telegram; those who "ate at Bokassa's table, the man who consumes human flesh;" and "hard pressed" imperialism "ready for anything." It was delirium. Marchais talked on and on without interruptions. It lasted 40 minutes. On that Friday 11 January, he set up his soapbox in Moscow, a few steps away from the Kremlin, in a Soviet television studio. There was not a single Frenchman around him, only Soviet technicians who could not believe their eyes nor their ears. Your regime must be terribly weak, they thought, and the PCF terribly strong for its leader to be able to speak in this manner over state television! It is an unthinkable situation for a Soviet. He knows nothing of liberalism and freedom of speech. For him, there are only strong and weak nations. The technician thought to himself that France had to

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be in full disarray for an opponent to be able to speak from abroad so strongly and at such length against his own country. Comrade Popov, the Soviet TV technician, was suddenly filled with well-being. He who, since kindergarten had been neck-deep in official anti-capitalist propaganda and doubtful for so long, was relenting and beginning to believe. Could everything that was being said about the dreadful situation in Western countries be true? Comrade Marchais seemed to believe it too and, furthermore, he was saying so over his country's official broadcasting network; in addition, he was making fun of journalists well regarded by the French leaders! Rather disconcerting, no? With unusual haste, Soviet television had the integral script of the broadcast mimeographed and, one hour later, distributed it among the foreign correspondents assigned to Moscow. However, the interview was not used. Another one was produced in which Marchais went even further in his support of the Soviet position in the Afghan affair. The PCF secretary general then shut his suitcase and, his mission completed, returned to Paris.

He was satisfied. He had no doubts. Juquin and Plissonier informed him that, as soon as the broadcast was over, the switchboard at the Place du Colonel Fabien had been flooded with calls from comrades delighted by his speech. It was so busy, they said, that a staff member had to be assigned to answer all those congratulations. Stirred up by Marchais' speech, old-time Stalinists rejoiced. It was clear, unambiguous and it recalled the good old time! Many of them have been relieved since last Friday. They have finally regained the intellectual comfort which the party had long been able to give them. This reassuring mechanism is: outside the Communist Party there are nothing but skunks, rotters and traitors.

This is what they felt when they watched Marchais on television. There was to be no more compromise with social-democracy; no more "pas de deux" with Mitterrand. "Go to it, Georges, you're on the right track. Keep on. That's how we love you!" The leadership did not have to look too far to arouse "spontaneous" approvals. Furthermore, when communists are displeased, they do not call party headquarters. This suits the secretariat general which, almost without lying, is then able to invoke the loyalty of the rank and file. Yet, discontent is widespread. However, it remains hidden and when it appears, it is amid confusion. On the other hand, the silently declining membership is a measurable index. It dropped to 200,000 although a triumphant Marchais announced there were 700,000 card-bearing members at the beginning of last year.

Well then, all things considered, would the Marchais phenomenon be catastrophic for the PCF? And besides, pray tell, the other day in Moscow, under the Russian spotlights, did he not lose his composure and sense of reality? It is unlikely on the part of such a well seasoned "professional." At the very most, the tentative assumption that he overreacted may be proffered. Marchais could be enthralled by the life he has been leading for the past several months, a life which has something to do with his candidacy to the presidency of the republic. He visited Yugoslavia, Algeria where he saw Chadli, Poland, Cuba and Nicaragua. He met with Yasser Arafat and spoke with the Polisario. In 1980 he is due to visit Africa, particularly Angola, and maybe the United

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States. He is received everywhere as a leading personality. In the USSR, he received the red carpet treatment. He was housed in a governmental dacha with his delegation and driven in a limousine reserved for chiefs of state. He was invited by the Bolshoi to a special gala evening organized to celebrate the great Galina Ulanova's 70th birthday. He visited olympic facilities and, east of Moscow, the Soviet cosmonauts' training center which is only shown to trustworthy guests. To avoid being harassed, he had asked the Soviet embassy in Paris not to issue visas to the journalists who wanted to follow him in his trip. Not bad for the former small-time SNECMA [National Research and Construction Company for Airplane Motors] metal worker! It is enough to turn even a level head! However, the true reason for his violent speech must be sought elsewhere. Let us listen instead to a communist intellectual who clearly condemns Marchais' "shameful alignment" on Moscow. Based on the principle according to which Soviet leaders practice, in all instances, a long-term policy, it can be said that Marchais went to the USSR to be recycled. These past few years, he acted as though he was shirking Brezhnev's vodka and caviar. He had not set foot in Moscow since 1974. The union of the left was then at its zenith. If one paid attention to what was being said at the Communist Party's headquarters, one heard that power was at hand and it did not matter if the USSR was unhappy. A change in mood set in from 1977 on. PCF noted that the union of the left was being made at its expense. Place du Colonel Fabien, the idea that capitalism was dying was gaining ever greater support. Undoubtedly inspired from abroad, the PCF leadership refined its analysis and explained that something big was brewing; communism was on the side of history and it would soon succeed. Georges Marchais gained an ascendancy unrelated to his electoral representation, over the French political scene which he fascinated and terrorized. Publicly trampling on journalists with impunity, Marchais found strength in his analysis: he was not encountering resistance because the opponent was weakening. Therefore, one had to persevere and hit still harder. But, say you, his tactic is suicidal. His excesses obviously play in Giscard's hand and a televised broadcast like that of 11 January will tend to set him back. The Kremlin knows that, but in this planet-scale chess game, the square on which France stands is not the most important. Our intellectual believes the Soviets' scheme calls for maintaining Giscard in the Elysee. They judge him to be weak and, therefore, they prefer him to anyone else, whether the name be Mitterrand or Chirac, liable to thwart their maneuvers. Well then, is Marchais being manipulated? Undoubtedly and he is bound to know it. He even balked for years, whence the "quarrel" between the PCF and Moscow which, after all, was not very serious since the main element was being protected, namely, the Soviet viewpoint. All the same, let us recall that it was candidate Giscard d'Estaing that the Soviet ambassador to Paris visited between the two presidential ballots in 1974 and not Mitterrand for whom communists were posting handbills. Consequently, Marchais would now be acting with more conviction convinced that, in any case, capitalism is going to fall like a ripe fruit.

Moreover, it is what he told Berlinguer in Rome prior to being taken to Moscow in an Aeroflot plane. He spoke before skeptical Italian communists about imperialism being pushed against the wall, voided of any credibility and on the brink of collapse. According to him, Afghanistan is but a link in the

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revolutionary chain sweeping through the world and defeating the common enemy. Russian armored tanks or no, unwarranted intervention or no, one must choose one's camp and be ready for what is brewing. Marchais did just that, in his own style. Too bad if some people are shocked, too bad for the French socialists who continue to say "Union of the left forever."

One final question is left. Does the president of the republic still want to meet Georges Marchais to discuss the world situation? Does he need to hear the ventriloquist's performance of the PCF secretary general reciting a text learned in Moscow? Does he not judge as unbecoming the speech given abroad? This idea does not seem to have many partisans in the Elysee. Marchais is not being judged on what he is but on what he represents, in this case, one voter out of five. Furthermore, it is not because the PCF leadership chose the role of a martyr being persecuted by the ill forces of capitalism and chose to withdraw behind its walls that French communists must be rejected by the national community. When Jean-Francois Poncet met with Andre Lajoinie, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, he told him that the president would find interesting the muscovite impressions of the secretary general. Marchais giving information to Giscard, that would be comical.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MIRAGE F-1 SUPER 530 WEAPONS SYSTEM NOW OPERATIONAL

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 22 Dec 79 pp 27-30

[Article by Jean de Galard, photographs by Michael Isaac: "The Mirage F-1 Super 530 Weapons System is Now Operational in the Air Force"]

[Text] According to general of the air corps Phillippe Archambeaud, a demonstration organized by the Air Defense Command took place last Tuesday, 19 December 1979, at Cambrai Base, home of the Twelfth Fighter Division, with the first deliveries of the new high performance Matra Super 530 air to air missiles to squadrons 1 and 2 ("Cambresis" and "Champagne") of the Twelfth Fighter Division.

This device's performance and characteristics place it completely in the forefront of interception at high altitude and high speed. Conceived in 1968, it was designed from the first to equip the Mirage F-1 built by Dassault-Breguet.

The Mirage F-1 Super 530 weapons system is henceforth operational in the Air Force. So the Mirage F-1, already equipped with its two 30 mm canons and Magic air to air missiles for close combat, is reaching new possibilities in the territorial air defense service. Thanks to the Matra Super 530 missile, which adds a new dimension to interception, the F-1 is worth considerably more in its primary mission, which is superiority in the air. Much of what is written in these pages bears witness to it.

Last Tuesday's demonstration was attended by Air Force General Guy Fleury, chief staff officer of the Air Force, many representatives of official services, and industrialists. Many journalists were also present at this "celebration;" an account of which follows.

The Twelfth Fighter Division's basic mission is to help make national sovereignty respected in French air space and to oppose possible aggressions at any altitude. The first deliveries to it of the high performance Matra Super 530 air to air missile marks the end of a program defined in 1968. Its long time in being accomplished was caused, not by industrial delays, but by the necessity of having to spread the budget

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over a period of time. This is only one of the things General Archambeaud, air defense commandant, was bent on emphasizing in the statement that he made at Cambrai last Tuesday, at the occasion of the Mirage F-1 Super 530 weapons system's becoming operational.

"The Super 530 has finally joined its F-1 for which it was made," he also stated in the presence of General Fleury, chief staff officer of the Air Force. His interested audience included the Cambrai deputy prefect, several local elected officials, many representatives of official services and industrialists who took part in the Mirage F-1 Super 530 program, many intermediate and high officers of the Air Force, and representatives of the press.


After having itemized the missile's characteristics and emphasized its performances, General Archambeaud greatly stressed the importance of detection as a means of air defense, and the considerable progress in this respect which Matra Super 530 has made over the 530, its predecessor. Because it needs less time for interception, it enhances the value of several air bases where defense units are stationed.

While General Archambeaud was speaking, two Twelfth Division Mirage F-1's, after takeoff on alert, successfully proceeded off the English Channel coasts to the real interception and the simulated destruction of a hostile airplane (in this case a Mirage IV from the Strategic Air Forces whose trajectory was followed by air defense stations' radar and was away from the direction in which the military radar controllers were guiding the interception patrol pilots). On their return, at the "de-briefing" of the mission, it was interesting to hear their account of the so-called interception. The leader: radar contact at 25 nm from the Mirage IV; objective's evasive action at 20 nm; radar lock and "missile sound" at 12 nm; fired at 10 nm. The crewman: radar lock, "sound" and missile fired at 12 nm.

Engineer general of weapons and director of STET (Technical Services for Tactical Devices) Coulmy state that the happy ending of this long program was "the result of a fruitful and exemplary, but not always easy, cooperation." He named the industries which participated in this program: Matra (project manager under the control of the technical devices directorate); EMD (homing head); Thomson-CSF (proximity fuse); Thomson-Brandt (rocket motor, warhead); SOGEA (primable battery to supply the electric energy necessary for the missile during its flight, which ranges from 2.5 to 30 seconds); Crouzet (safety apparatus); SNEP (solid fuel and explosive); Aerospatiale (maintenance system).

The delivery of Super 530 missiles to the air defense squadrons involves the construction of special facilities for periodic control and missile function testing.

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The return to Cambrai Base, 18 December 1979, after a 50 nm flight, of the two Matra Super 530 equipped Mirage F-1's of the Twelfth Fighter Division which have just intercepted a "hostile" Mirage IV flying at supersonic speeds above the English Channel. Mission accomplished: Captain Monnet, patrol leader (his crewman was Captain Gavoty) leaves his airplane to go to "debriefing." Notice the Magic missiles at the ends of the wings.

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Super 530's "Proportional Navigation"

The conditions for interception imposed on the Super 530 missile by some targets with large load factors which can escape by flying at sharply different altitudes from that of the interceptor require that the missile guidance remain fast and accurate in spite of the great variations in speed and altitude which it undergoes during its free flight.



Five trumps of the Mirage F-1 in its "air defense" configuration: One of the two 30 mm canons embedded along the fuselage axis (the right side here), a weapon which remains formidable in aerial combat; a Matra Super 530 air to air missile under the wing; a Matra 550 air to air missile at the end of the wing; on the wing, tips and automatic hyperlifting flaps which improve combat maneuverability.

All tactical air to air missiles are self-guided, which means that the commands given to the actuators are generated on board the missiles; a homing head fixes the target's reference in relation to the missile. Various navigation laws may be applied. The simplest is straight pursuit. Then the guidance is such that the missile's velocity vector is permanently directed at the target; the missile follows a trajectory known as a dog curve. This law has the disadvantage of imposing a constant bank on the missile, which slows it and lengthens its trajectory. It can be improved by shifting the direction of the missile's velocity vector at a constant angle in the direction of the target's velocity vector. This technique is difficult to apply

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(it is necessary to determine in space the plane in which the shift must be made and to calculate the magnitude of the shift).

On the other hand, the collision shot (or pursuit on a leading target) supposes that the missile will go in a straight line until impact, if the target doesn't alter course (if it alters course the missile's trajectory must be subsequently modified). The missile then flies at minimum power and saves all its maneuverability to parry the possible evasions of the target.

This law's application is made difficult by the necessity of knowing some characteristics of the target's movement which are difficult to acquire at present.

That is why the navigation law which is used, called the law of proportional navigation, is intermediate between the law of straight pursuit and the law of pursuit on a leading target. It sets the rotational speed of the missile's velocity vector proportional to the right hand rotational speed of the target-missile; it self-adjusts to the large variation in velocity undergone during the propelled time of its free flight.

Effecting this law, which ensures that the target-missile's right hand rotation will determine the load factor taken by the missile, is done in the following manner: a homing head measures the velocity of the target-missile's right hand rotation and determines the corresponding guidance commands; the piloting system subordinates the missile's load factor to this command, while maintaining the missile's stability. The first homing heads were fixed on the missile's axis and allowed only straight pursuit navigation. Using the proportional navigation law, homing heads on all new missiles are mobile with respect to the missile. They require a gimbal mounted head, constantly pointed toward the target, whatever the missile's position. The right hand movements of the target-missile are disclosed by gyrometers and a computer, which compute the commands to the actuators to follow the navigation law.

The head's orientation is obtained in various ways, according to the type of homing head used; the semi-active homing head on the Super 530 requires only a radar receiver, the transmitter is the firing plane's radar. The pilot uses the latter to attain a good position (acquisition of the target, navigation to within firing range). The radar must continue to hold the target during the missile's entire free flight; consequently the pilot receives commands from the radar. The Super 530's homing head, integrated with the Cyrano 4 on board radar, is electromagnetic.


F-1 Super 530 Weapons System's Mission Type

The Super 530 missile is primarily designed for interception missions, any time, any place.

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Presentation of the Super 530 in its cradle



Mounting the two Magic Missiles

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- a) The pilot and the mechanic survey the plane
- b) The maintenance of a Mirage F-1 in "air defense" configuration, returned from an interception mission and back under its concrete shelter, requires a series of operations which the ground mechanics must perform rapidly and with a high level of safety. A partial list in the order of performance: engage the seat safety; change the oxygen converter; fill with fuel; change the parachute brakes; mount and lock the Magic missiles on the ends of the wings; rearm the canons; verify the cabin gear and controls, as well as of the forward train; align, mount, and lock the Super 530 missile; after the 3,200 litre fill up, the pilot signs the "flight voucher"; disengage the "weapons" and radome-protector safeties; the pilot and mechanic visually inspect the exterior; disengage the seat safety, close the canopy. The last four photographs correspond to the four phases of this maintenance sequence. Twelve minutes are sufficient to maintain F-1, which then leaves again on a new mission.

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When the alert is given on the ground or in flight, the interceptor is guided toward the hostile object by an air defense radar station. When the distance and angle of presentation allow it, the on board radar is locked on. From then on, the interception computer transmits, by the intermediary of the aimer, the piloting commands, which are determined as a function of the enemy's radar detected trajectory and also of the missile's capabilities.

At the same time the on board radar transmits to the missile commands for the homing head. When the axis of the missile's antenna is synchronized with that of the radar antenna, the homing head system is ready to receive echoes of the on board radar impulses which are reflected by the target. The system's range, a function of the target's apparent surface, is several tens of km for a fighter sized airplane.

After the homing head is locked in, a light and sound signal authorizes the shot. During the final phase of interception the firing plane maneuvers at a constant altitude. Because of its ability to change altitude, the missile makes up the difference in altitude between the fighter and the target. The interceptor's radar continues to light the target until its destruction.

The explosion is triggered either by an active electromagnetic proximity fuse, at the crosswise passage, or by an impact fuse.

The warhead is suited perfectly to the crossing distances achieved by the guidance system.

Finally, to ensure the safety of the launching plane, a device allows the charge to be ignited only if the following conditions are met: separation of the missile from the girder; enough time elapsed after the rocket motor's ignition to endure the attacking plane's safety, the shot's effective radius being limited to a few hundred meters; sufficient longitudinal acceleration.


Two Interception Examples; one with 530, and one with Super 530

The following diagram shows two interception mission profiles. One is executed by a Mirage F-1 equipped with a Matra 530 missile having a semi-active electromagnetic EMD homing head. The other was executed by a Mirage F-1 equipped with a Matra Super 530 missile with a semi-active radar Super AD26 homing head, also built by Marcel Dassault Electronics. The diagram is representative of the progress the Super 530 has made, and the formidable advantage it gives the airplane carrying it.

In the first instance the enemy is supposed to be flying at around Mach 2, between 50,000 and 60,000 feet. To intercept and to fire the R530 missile, the pilot, immediately after take-off, ascends with after burners firing until he reaches the tropopause at Mach .9. He then accelerates to supersonic velocity (about Mach 1.5) and pursues an isomach ascent.

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He is then between 43,000 and 45,000 feet up at about 8 nm after take-off, and if the distance from the enemy is about 5 to 7 nm, he can fire the missile.



Comparison of the two F-1 missions; one executed with a Matra 530 missile, the other with a Matra Super 530, this drawing indeed shows how much the Super 530 improves the Mirage's interceptions.

During the supersonic ascent the on board radar and the homing head have been locked on target. After the shot, the plane's ascension rate must be increased to keep the enemy on radar until the missile arrives and destroys it. To be successful, this mission must be initiated at several hundred km (about 500) from the enemy.

In the second case the objective is the same (altitude range between 50,000 and 60,000 feet, velocity about Mach 2), but the airplane is equipped with a Super 530. The pilot takes off, ascends (subsonic velocity, PC firing) to 20,000 feet, at much lower altitude than the tropopause. On board radar and missile homing head are locked in at the end of the ascent. The shot takes place as soon as the fighter is within range, and because of its ability to change altitude, the missile makes up the difference in altitude and it destroys its objective only 2 to 3 nm after take-off.

It is seen that by lowering the altitude necessary to fire and in abolishing the ascent phase at supersonic velocity, the Super 530 divides by three the time and distance needed after the alert warning.

Compared with the 530, the Super 530's performances in range and acquisition distance are doubled; acceleration is also multiplied by two.

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There is a veritable energy transfer between the plane and the missile; Super 530 allows considerable extension of the plane's field of action. At 35,000 feet and at Mach 1.9, the pilot of an F-1 with a Super 530 can intercept any enemy maneuvering between 5,000 and 65,000 feet.

In addition, the F-1 Super 530 pilot can target an enemy flying at 75,000 feet and at Mach 2.5.

In summary, compared with the interception missiles of the preceding generation, the Super 530 has the two following advantages: on one hand it allows interceptions without recoil, or with very weak ones, even against enemies flying at Mach 2 between 30,000 and 50,000 feet; on the other hand it allows interceptions of the highest performance planes in existence, even when they are flying at the maximum of their capabilities.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

PCF GOAL DEFINED--The confidential reports reaching the offices of the minister of the interior and the personal advisors of President Giscard all agree concerning these points: contrary to the prevailing belief among the [nation's] leaders, the PCF, as a structured force, will not suffer much or long from the position taken by [Georges] Marchais on the Afghan invasion. "Rest assured that right now the politburo of the PCF cares nothing about the idea of gaining or losing three points among its electorate... Its real worry right now concerns developing a solid base in the cities that it assumed power in 1977 and continuing to infiltrate the largest number possible of trade unions and [business] associations." [Excerpt] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 21 Jan 80 p 2]

DOUMENG RUNNING BLOCKADE--Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, the "red millionaire," is setting up an operation aimed at breaking the U.S. blockade on goods for the USSR. He is said to be buying sugar and grain that will probably be transported by companies based on Malta. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 21 Jan 80 p 5]

HIGH-LEVEL VIEWS--[Minister of Foreign Affairs] Jean Francois-Poncet has let us know that there is no disagreement between him and President Giscard concerning French policy with respect to the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, any such disagreement would be inconceivable at present within the government as established. It seems, however, that certain government advisors are afraid that a too moderate approach on our part will encourage the hawks rather than the doves in the other camp. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 21 Jan 80 p 5]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

'CENSIS' REPORT ON COUNTRY'S SOCIAL SITUATION

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 6 Dec 79 p 3

[Articles by Antonio Duva, Gianfranco Fabi, and Paolo Mastromo: "Reality and Social Problems in Italy: the 13th CENSIS Report to CNEL: the 1979 Situation and the Country's Prospects"]

[Text] Neocorporative Risks and the Role of Reform

The CENSIS report has the merit of bringing to light many of the most mysterious and controversial aspects of Italian society in recent years. Concealed employment, the hidden economy, and the unsuspected vitality of many localities have been analyzed for the first time in CENSIS documents. They are sometimes accompanied by graphic and appropriate definitions: "dust," "bush," and the like.

The Center's experts recently completed their labors for 1979. The report comprises 580 pages filled with data and tables; it has already been submitted to the CNEL [National Council for Economy and Labor], and some excerpts from the introduction are given here.

IL SOLE-24 ORE plans to pay particular attention in the next few days to the CENSIS analyses in the social sectors: education, the labor market, industrial relations, social security, construction, and local autonomy. This most painstaking report establishes links between the economy and society; what is the general picture of Italy that it paints on the eve of the 1980's?

Is the country "floating" through the crisis or are signs of weakening beginning to appear in the processes and mechanisms that have so far kept events from taking a traumatic turn?

These questions appear especially urgent when we consider the international context, which seems daily to become more charged with threatening unknowns.

The international monetary crisis, the change in the exchange rate, the increased costs of raw materials, the energy crisis, and the worrisome growth of world tensions with their military implications are chapters in a difficult book that the Italian ruling class and the country in general ought to show they can read correctly.

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Are they up to the task? And for this purpose is it sufficient to make more effective the mechanisms of adaptation that Italian society, in a largely spontaneous way, has set in motion in recent years? Or is it indispensable rather to undertake "more precise and informed political projects?"

To answer these questions, the CENSIS x-ray starts from where it left off in 1978, namely with the analysis of the complex factors commonly known as the "submerged economy," on the one hand, and with an analysis of the growing vitality of many local economic systems, on the other.

Up to the past year, CENSIS indicators showed rather marked growth in these two socioeconomic mechanisms; so much so that the authors of the report were led to speak of an "immeasurable boom."

Now, however, the CENSIS evaluation is a bit more cautious and precise.

From one standpoint there is no lack of signs of new business activity, both in markets and productive technology and in activity in certain areas (commercial brokers, industrial service suppliers, and the like).

But the world of small business, civil service jobs and office employment is not shrinking, either.

Arrangement and consolidation, then, seem to be the dominant notes of a situation that seems to be losing the harsh connotations it had until recently. An almost analogous process characterizes what CENSIS has called the "archipelago of local economies and societies."

CENSIS observes that what we are going through is a "transitional phase to a more adult, less aggressive, and more clearly defined dimension of society" beyond the great plans that gave rise to hopes and, too often, illusions in the early 60's and, at the same time, beyond the hollowly vital aggressivity of more recent times filled with self-destructive tendencies.

CENSIS experts do strive withal to derive reassuring predictions from these contradictory trends, in which positive signs are closely intertwined with less encouraging ones.

"In Italy," the Report says, "we are beginning to witness a growing use of time as a dimension and resource. After years of day-to-day living in an almost continuous dependence on the implicit tyranny of the present, we are beginning to be able to look backwards and understand the historical lines of our social evolution and see our future problems."

But how much will this "use" of time as a dimension be of assistance in getting out of the difficulties of the moment?

Only to a limited extent; that is the answer that emerges from the CENSIS document. But at least some of the problems that Italy is stuck with now can be disentangled if things are not to deteriorate further.

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First, the "governing of economic institutions" must be restored, because the decision-making centers presiding over this sector have been gradually impoverished.

An effort is also being made toward autonomy and achieving the unitary management of reform and of the areas of social action "in order to avoid spoiling things with unsustainable spending and general discontent."

Finally, it seems urgent to have "a tertiary level policy that will confront coherently a series of problems that are increasingly important but also increasingly susceptible to corporate solutions."

This provides the opportunity to evaluate precisely the political and institutional debate taking place in the country. Diagnoses and proposals, the authors of the CENSIS report maintain, should be deemed positive or not to the extent that they bridge the gap between the political system and society; this gap is considered by many to be more than a secondary cause of the present unease.

Civil society must begin to express values and unity that "go beyond the particularistic and submerged dimensions in which it has prospered in recent years."

These are obviously not short-range operations, but they are necessary to prevent the "neocorporative transformation" of society that CENSIS denounces and that, if it proceeds, will pollute perhaps irremediably the processes of development that have emerged in recent years.

A New Economic Geography: an Accident Not on the Program

Urban areas can be divided into three fundamental types:

Metropolitan areas (especially high-technology monocultures), which, despite their reduced physico-demographic dimensions, have systems of indicators and relations analogous to the largest metropolitan areas; this typology uses the Prato and Modena systems.

Diffuse areas (in the case of largely diversified production) that discontinuously occupy the whole territory and allow primary and secondary activities to coexist; this model is particularly widespread in the regions of Lombardy and Veneto.

Polycentric areas (especially in the case of strong preexisting infrastructures and urban areas) in which population centers and territorial links are being strengthened in a rather evenly distributed manner; this is probably the kind of settled area most present in the territory of the submerged economy insofar as it involves the vital areas of regions such as Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, and southern regions (Puglia and southwest Sicily).

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We wish to use the data to describe the phenomena and tendencies previously mentioned; in doing so, we may arrive at the 1981 development projections for the "Project 80" metropolitan areas, with the 1981 populations projections based on an average annual rate of increase equal to that of 1971-77 (table 1).

TAB. 1

IL RIFLUSSO DELLE AREE METROPOLITANE (1) (A)

(C) Aree metropolitane	(B) Tassi medi annui (x 1.000)			(D) Le previs. del prog. '80 al 1981 (in 000)	Le previs. al 1981 (tasso med.) 71-77 (in 000)	(E) (F) Differenze (+) o (-) (in 000)
	1951-1961	1961-1971	1971-1977			
Milano	21,4	20,2	8,0	7,202	6,151	- 1.051
Napoli	14,9	11,3	12,1	4,190	4,113	- 77
Roma	28,2	24,2	6,1	3,972	3,169	- 803
Torino	34,7	24,5	5,5	2,247	1,765	- 482
Genova	12,8	5,7	0	1,381	1,112	- 269
Firenze	17,3	16,0	6,8	1,132	992	- 140
Palermo	17,4	8,6	9,9	817	766	- 51
Bologna	28,2	14,5	- 1,5	744	543	- 201

(1) I perimetri delle aree sono quelli definiti al 1961.

Fonte: Elab. CENSIS su dati « Progetto 80 » e CESPE (Bollettino n. 11 agosto 1979). (G)

[Key to Table 1]:

- (A) Emigration From Metropolitan Areas (1)
- (B) Average annual rates (in thousands)
- (C) Metropolitan areas:
 - Milan
 - Naples
 - Rome
 - Turin
 - Genoa
 - Florence
 - Palermo
 - Bologna
- (D) Project 80 forecast for 1981 (in thousands)
- (E) Forecast for 1981 (average rate for 1971-77) (in thousands)
- (F) Differences plus or minus (in thousands)
- (G) (1) The perimeters of the metropolitan areas are those set in 1961.
Source: CENSIS interpretation of "Project 80" data, and CESPE [Center for Studies in Economic Policy (of the PCI)] (Bulletin of 11 Aug 79).

The cresting of demographic growth is even more apparent in the big cities, considered like the 14 communes with more than 250,000 inhabitants, where the percentage variation in resident population has scarcely been 0.9 percent, as opposed to 4.6 percent in the other communes and 4.0 percent for Italy as a whole.

Other indicators, such as marriages, the birth rate, and the number of dwellings constructed, are also decreasing faster than the national average.

Since the natural component of demographic movement has been weakening for the last 7 years, some large cities, with the exception of Bari, are showing quite obvious negative tendencies, though the others are at a plateau.

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The areas of the country in which demographic development has been concentrated in recent years are those of the center-south.

In fact, if the Italian provinces are listed in order of percentage variation in population between 1972 and 1978, it will be seen that the top ten are the provinces of the South and lower Latium, while all the provinces showing decreases are in the center-north.

Population mobility in recent years has been the main cause of the growth of the large cities, but it seems to be diminishing quantitatively and changing its direction of flow.

Changes of residence dropped from 1,552,116 in 1974 to 1,256,958 in 1978, for a decrease of 19 percent.

Only four regions (Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, and Sicily) show a net loss in the 5-year period, but Puglia, Abruzzi, Molise, and Sardinia showed net gains in some cases, especially as an effect of reimmigration from abroad.

In any case, this goes counter to the Southern regions' past tendency to lose resident population.

Finally, as concerns the analysis of the models of the territorial bases involved in the development of local economies, the prime example is the case of the Prato area already analyzed in the past year under the profile of the productive system, which represents one of the most relevant examples of the metropolitan organization of territory especially in the presence of contained immigration.

Indeed, we see that the growth rate of some communes in the Prato district and the main community itself appears clearly higher than that of the province of Florence and its complex and in some cases, e.g. Montemurlo, there are demographic explosions analogous to those of the largest metropolitan areas.

The composition of the migratory flows also presents characteristics typical of the metropolitan areas both in the heavy interchange between the Prato Commune and the other communes of the area and also in drawing from other zones and regions.

These are the primary points of a phenomenology of the new tendencies of territorial population trends that are being increasingly noted in this country; from these tendencies it can be seen in synthesis that the axis of urban and demographic growth is shifting from the largest to the middle-sized areas, according to articulated and extremely diversified urban models both as population groupings and as distribution of population densities, which would certainly require adequate governing instrumentalities, especially at the institutional level.

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The Problems of the Submerged Economy

(1) The pervasive complexity of our system, which has been described many times in this report, poses problems of internal and external limits, and these problems should not be underestimated.

The "undergrowth phase," together with the rediscovery and renewal of the medium, small, and individual-sized Italian business enterprise, seen from the standpoint of evolution and consolidation, suffers from critical points that can be summed up as follows:

--the obvious quantitative and qualitative links that have been emerging in the area of labor use (from aspects of demography and mobility to the increase of job-related disabilities in various sectors, and the distortion of vocational training);

--the lack of services and support systems (in general terms of tertiary-level quality, with reference to relations with the credit system in its capacity for opening to and relations with foreign countries at the same level of system innovation);

--the emergency due to the energy crisis, the full reality of which does not yet seem to have clearly emerged, will no doubt eventually have an impact on the structure, behavior and choices of business and on an economic development based on a cheap, readily available energy supply.

It seems opportune to reflect specifically on all these aspects by examining phenomenological and/or planning data as available, but referring also to:

--some well-defined local economic realities, whose most immediately definable problems are indicated herein;

--some sectors of industrial activity dominated and shaped by small and medium production units.

(2) The first group of problems concerns labor. In some highly productive areas a definite slowing down is taking place because of a gradual reduction in the supply of the labor force. This has its origin in a more general process of population decline. This phenomenon is apparent, for example, in the Vigevano footwear area, where the total resident population has been declining since 1974.

Analogous phenomena of demographic contraction are also found in the Biella district, which is noted for its high concentration of woollens industries and for its high productivity. Between 1974 and 1977 the population of Biella went into a decline that brought its net rate of change from plus 0.1 percent in 1974 to minus 0.3 percent in 1978.

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The population decline is compensated only in part by the reversal of migratory flow, which is beginning to show a positive trend in more zones of the country because of the return of adult migrants.

Actually, only in Biella is there a positive net migration, but there is negative migration in the Bergamo and Udine zones, which results in a negative balance. The former zone has a high level of development, and the latter is characterized by more recent, though marked growth.

But demographic indices alone may not be enough to motivate the further growth that is being made in these "mature" areas by the development of small and medium businesses. Field research yields the following:

--on one hand, the possible positive net migration does not seem likely to make much difference, because the labor force that is returning is predominantly adult, while youth are strongly attracted to other areas;

--on the other, the labor demand in these zones is not matched by a suitable labor supply.

These aspects have become obvious and, hence, perhaps easier to document in some areas that have developed up to the "saturation" point. But similar symptoms are found in zones under consolidation; this is true for the whole Pesaro zone (an automobile and mechanical sector), where about 74 percent of the businesses (according to a 1976 survey by the Pesaro commune) have suffered from a lack of qualified workers on the labor market.

Limits to Growth Are Already Set

The problem of absolute availability of labor is therefore very intricate and puts rather widespread limitations on quality.

(3) To this is added the problems of labor conditions in zones where small and medium businesses are concentrated and where there is a high rate of activity; there is a disturbingly high proportion of job-related illnesses and accidents.

In addition to the delicacy of the problem there is a lack of up-to-date, analyzed facts on the sectors of activity and the individual zones. This lack of information is greater for areas of recent local activity, which have a greater capacity for stimulating the participation of workers unemployed elsewhere and not always adequately trained.

An examination of available sources reveals that in the northwest and central parts of Italy, where small business is most prevalent, the rate of injuries reported is higher than the national average and even reaches the levels of the South; for example, in Emilia-Romagna alone the accident rate of 56.3 is almost the same as the Southern average (56.7), but in Tuscany it is 60.8 and in Umbria, 60.1, even higher.

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Looking at these aspects more closely, it may be observed that there are sectors of activity in which job-related injuries are increasing. In ceramics, there are 1,046 for every 1,000 insured; in clothing, 1,023; in textiles (cotton, wool, silk), 1,009; but in the chemical industry, which is commonly considered dangerous, there are 956.

In this kind of contexts, the relative or absolute rate of job-related injuries reaches such a level in some production areas that it is necessary quickly to restructure and bring up to date plant and working conditions if production slowdowns (through absenteeism or refusal to work) are to be avoided.

In the sector of flooring and ceramic tile alone, for example, according to a survey by the National Association of Tile Producers, the rate of absenteeism per 100 working hours in the first half of 1978 due to accidents and work-related illnesses was 1.87, but the rate for illness was 11.7. For all industrial sectors at the national level, these same rates are much lower: 0.69 for accidents and job-related illnesses and 6.86 for illnesses.

There are, therefore, already in evidence conditions that forebode possible rigidity and limitations to productive growth.

(4) There are also signs of a growing lack of specialized personnel for many jobs. This phenomenon is especially connected with the low correlation between the system of job training and the present demand in the various areas. In this context it will be sufficient to point out (from the ISFOL report [expansion unknown] on job training, 1978) that the rate of employment of qualified youth in 1974-75, 2 1/2 years after graduation, is only 42.2 percent for those qualified in industrial work. With respect to local situations, it may be observed, for example, in the area of Pesaro only 15.8 percent of the employers hire workers out of trade school; in the furniture business, which is the most active in the zone, this drops to 10.1 percent, thus confirming a notable lack of correlation between the sector's needs and the vocational education system.

But the low supply of qualified personnel does not depend only on the unsuitability of vocational education. Tradespeople ranging from weavers to tailors in the textile-garment industry, from welders to lathe operators in the metalworking sector, are becoming increasingly rare and, therefore, sought after by business, with the consequence of increased costs and duplicate work.

(5) As for the organization of services and the support system of many zones, the critical problems are, notably:

--the continued expansion of tertiary employment quantitatively and qualitatively, with high productivity;

--difficult relations with the credit system, which is due especially to constant underutilization of opportune instruments such as credit unions;

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--reduced capacity for technological innovation, which not only makes for a passive national technological output but also strongly limits the possibilities for real expansion;

--insufficient coordination and agreement with local, public, or private institutions.

(a) The limits to growth that have appeared in the tertiary sector, especially the "new" tertiary sector having additional, increased value and being capable of favoring a more consolidated variety of development, are spread to varying degrees throughout local systems, mostly in manufacturing. The main causes of this seem to be as follows:

--a marked preference for using available resources and labor in a direct and active form in the cycle of production;

--a tendency to simplify jobs, both in the quality of items manufactured and through a decomposition of the phases of the distribution cycle of a single production unit.

It will suffice to mention the areas of Turin or Brescia, which show rates of tertiarization that are rather low (Brescia's are the lowest in Lombardy) and even lower in the tertiarization of businesses.

(b) As concerns credit problems, especially in cases in which local banks do not act as structures sustaining directly their areas' vitality, it is interesting to examine the evolution of credit unions and the low use that is still being made of these institutions. Access to credit still remains one of the main obstacles to the small businessman, who makes his fortune on productive elasticity and mobility and the ability to make quick production changes to anticipate market fluctuations.

(c) The reduced capacity for technological innovation, which is also expressed as heavy dependence on foreign countries for the acquisition of new technology, is another particularly critical point. The economic activity shown in table 2 reveals a constant worsening of the technological balance of payments in the clothing and footwear sectors (in this case the trend has been negative since 1972), and in metals and minerals (negative change of 23.7 percent in 1977-78); but the other sectors, while showing a negative net change, did show a slowing of the deficit in 1977-78.

The general picture, however (negative change of 87.6 percent in 1977-78), is amply "in the red," because the strong dependency on foreign countries in this field puts a particularly heavy burden especially on small businesses, which live by their aggressiveness and constant market penetration, as opposed to more consolidated, "slower" businesses. Among other things, technological conditions may in the long run cause the collapse of productive innovation, which is one of the pillars of local systems. All kinds of operations are to some extent at a technological disadvantage (patents, trade marks, design, technical assistance, know-how).

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TAB. 1

BILANCIA ITALIANA DEI PROGRAMMI TECNOLOGICI DEL 1977-78 (milioni di lire) (A)

ATTIVITA ECONOMICA (B)	1977 (C)		1978		Var. 77-78 (D)
	Saldo	%	Saldo	%	%
Industrie delle confezioni, abbigliamento e calzature	— 5.600	100,0	— 462.778	1,3	5,5
Industrie delle pelli e del cuoio	— 262	0,1	— 167	0,3	— 0,4
Industrie del mobilio e del legno	— 1.653	0,7	— 893	0,2	— 0,1
Industrie della lavorazione dei metalli e dei minerali	— 11.993	4,9	— 40.445	8,7	237,2
Costruzione macchine utensili non elettriche	— 22.841	9,3	— 23.721	5,1	3,9
TOTALE ITALIA	— 246.686	100,0	— 462.778	100,0	87,6

Fonte: ENI. (E)

[Key to Table 2]:

- (A) Italian Balance Sheet for Technological Programs in 1977-78
(in millions of lire)
- (B) Economic Activity
Ready-to-wear, clothing, and footwear industries
Fur and leather industries
Furniture-making and wood industries
Metalworking and minerals
Non-electric machine-tool manufacturing
Totals for Italy
- (C) Balance
- (D) Change in 1977-78
- (E) Source: ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency]

The Crucial Question: Energy Dependence

Prevalent innovation involves plant, equipment, and productive techniques and has the objective of increasing specific productivity; however, there is no stable research structure even in the more elastic forms of consortiums.

(d) A final complex of problems is that concerning zonal businesses and local institutions. Indeed, very different goals are sought by chambers of commerce, local banks, communities, and other local government entities; they impose strongly promotional policies and programs in the face of this vitality. In this case, the main problem is not making examples but rather raising a question, which seems to be far from being a minor one: to favor the structural reinforcement of a productive system that would otherwise be too shaky and/or, in other ways, tending to develop according

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to its own internal logic, often divorced from its social and environmental conditions.

(6) To ask the energy question at this point certainly does not mean that this problem is underestimated, nor does it mean ritualistically repeating that the country is in a phase in which it is becoming increasingly aware of the burden of its dependency on foreign countries. This theme would deserve much more ample consideration, but, while it is not easy to formulate plans for reduced consumption and for the development of alternative energy sources on a national scale, it is even less easy to do so for an economic system of small and medium dimensions that has prospered and still does on the basis of the availability of abundant, low-priced energy.

To make forecasts and estimates in this direction is extremely hard to do; however, it may somehow be useful to look at some of the industrial sectors, especially those mentioned thus far, on the basis of their capacity to generate employment and to use energy. If, as seems likely, the most direct method is to seek solutions by building up sectors with low energy consumption compared to those with high energy needs, it would mean, if we look at Table No 2, that the sectors of textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, wood and furniture (in industry), hotels and tourism (in services), would soon be in dire straits if national autonomy were reduced in this field.

(7) However, the vital zones of the country are being exposed to growing difficulties in many areas, and this requires more effective aid from public policies.

There are still many resources and potentialities, but the spontaneous reactions and adaptations of businessmen cannot be relied upon too heavily, for they might take unforeseen and inauspicious actions.

Public Rate Policy, or Wild Social Spending: the Request for Extended Services Was Answered With Neglect of Efficiency

The reference to the necessity for rationalizing the system of public transfer payments brings to mind a particular example of "wild" public spending, which is connected with this country's application of rate policy. Rate policy has indeed carried with it a substantial and growing difficulty in assuring the recovery of production costs, with the necessary consequence that the government must give businesses financial compensation.

An example of the progressive deterioration of the situation of public finances must be specifically assigned to the consequences of rate policy as practiced in the public corporation sector, i.e. among units supplying public services, among which are included, as has been noted, municipal corporations, autonomous corporations (operating mainly in the areas of railways and the postal service), and ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]. Public services have actually deteriorated financially in the past decade, rolling up a deficit that presently constitutes about a quarter of the needs of the public sector as a whole, and which consistently contributes to the growing rigidity and expansion of public spending.

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TAB. 3

**L'ONERE SULLA FINANZA PUBBLICA DELLE IMPRESE
DI PUBBLICA UTILITA' (in miliardi di lire 1970)**

VOCI	1970	1976	1977	1978
Trasferimenti (A)	424	1.086	1.290	1.208
Aziende autonome	300	759	992	926
Enel	—	271	201	178
Aziende municipalizzate	124	56	97	104
Indebitamento (B)	880	1.692	1.528	1.713
Aziende autonome	352	757	707	875
Enel	446	447	377	376
Aziende municipalizzate	82	488	444	462
Totale (A+B)	1.304	2.778	2.818	2.921
P.I.L. (C)	57.937	75.011	76.516	78.468
Fabbisogno settore pubbl. allarg. (D)	(*)	8.993	8.107	12.015
% Totale (A+B) su (C)	2,3	3,7	3,7	3,7
% Totale (A+B) su (D)	(*)	30,9	34,8	24,3

(*) Dato non disponibile.
Fonte: varie.

[Key to Table 3]:

(1) Public Financing of Public Corporations (in billions of lire 1970)

(2) Items

Transfer payments (A)

Autonomous corporations

ENEL

Municipal corporations

Indebtedness (B)

Autonomous corporations

ENEL

Municipal corporations

Total (A+B)

PIL [expansion unknown] (C)

General public sector needs (D)

Percent of total (A+B) ÷ C

Percent of total (A+B) ÷ D

(3) * Data not available.

Various sources

The data in Table 3 show that:

--first, concerning deficits, from a general net indebtedness of 880 billion lire in 1970 (corresponding to 1.5 percent of the PIL), the indebtedness rose in 1978 to 1.713 billion lire (corresponding to 4.820 billion lire at current prices and to 2.2 percent of the PIL);

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--overall, public utilities' burden on public financing rose by 1.304 billion lire in 1970 to 2,921 billion lire at 1970 prices (4,820 billion lire at current prices) in 1978, but the percentage of the PIL grew from 2.2 to 3.7 percent; these expenses constitute 24.3 percent of the general needs of the public sector at large.

Special attention should be paid to municipal corporations, which have also shown large growth in management deficits and have contributed considerably to the disorder by making the communes' deficits fixed and uncontrollable.

TAB. 4

INCIDENZA SULLE SPESE CORRENTI DEI COMUNI DEGLI ONERI DERIVANTI DALLE AZIENDE MUNICIPALLIZZATE (in miliardi di lire) (*)

Voci	1977		1978	
	V.A.	%	V.A.	%
Spese correnti	6.649,8	100,0	7.887,2	100,0
Perdita az. trasporto	346,3	5,2	737,2	9,3
Contributi servizi trasporto	133,2	2,0	192,5	2,4
Perdita gestione altre aziende	47,8	0,7	—	—

(*) Dati provvisori, riferiti a 3.564 Comuni.
Fonte: Elaborazione Censis su dati ministero Interni.

[Key to Table 4]:

- (1) Impact of Municipal Corporation Subsidies on the Current Expenses of Communes (in billions of lire)*
- (2) Items
 - Current expenses
 - Transport company losses
 - Contributions to transportation services
 - Other company management losses
- (3) * Provisional data for 3,564 communes
Source: CENSIS interpretation of Interior ministry data

Provisional data on "certificates," which the communes and provinces were required by law to transmit to the Interior ministry through the prefecture offices beginning in 1978 showed from the first (see Table 4) that:

--in the 3,564 communes thus far considered (which include about 60 percent of the country's population), current expenses came to a little over 6.5 billion lire in 1977; the transport companies' management deficit constituted 5.2 percent of these expenses, but another 2.7 percent is attributable to contributions to transportation services and to losses by other corporations;

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--subsidies to transport companies in general should jump to 11.7 percent of the communes' overall current expenses in 1978; these expenses are projected at 7.887 billion lire.

Another proof of this disarray in public service financing is provided by balance-sheet data.

In the first place, it may be observed that:

--the percentage of the amount invoiced (measured by entries for sales of goods and services) out of general current expenses has now dropped to 44.2 percent for the Autonomous Companies and to 42.5 percent for municipal companies. The incidence of entries per amount invoiced compared to all entries has been gradually declining at the same time;

--only ENEL manages to cover all its current expenses through billing since it made appreciable structure and level changes in its rates in 1974, and it shows an increase in the incidence of billing out of all entries (from 59.5 percent in 1970 to 79.9 percent forecast for 1979);

--transfer payments from national and local governments make up 38.8 percent of all entries for autonomous companies, and 19 percent of municipal companies' entries, but ENEL's is 15.4 percent;

--personnel costs have reached a very high level and, except for ENEL, are much more consistent than expenses for acquiring goods and services.

The increasing disparity between costs and return in this sector's financial situation has thus caused a high incidence of budgetary loss. This incidence is about 39 percent for ENEL, about 68 percent for the autonomous companies and about 83 percent for municipal companies.

As a consequence, rate levels are mostly unrelated to any objective economic considerations; there is no correlation between prices and the costs of the services. The main cause of such rate policies has been mentioned: below-cost rates have been part of a policy of redistributing incomes and broadening access to services.

Making rates the object of income equalization has incurred heavy negative consequences:

--public companies have been running heavy budget deficits, with consequent growing pressure on public finances to make up these deficits;

--public service industries are increasingly losing their margin of autonomy, for their criteria of economic viability are encumbered by political considerations, with a consequent release from responsibility for price and product cost structure;

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--there is an endemic lack of resources for amortization, investment, and renewal of plant and equipment, with low productivity gain, not to mention considerable loss in the quality and quantity of service;

--consumers are also released from responsibility, for they are convinced they can use an increasingly wide range of services (even if the quality often leaves something to be desired) by putting the burden on the community or on other users;

--a series of distortions is affecting the kinds and amounts of services used.

The use of rate policy as a kind of "hidden social cost" in favor of low incomes has been applied inefficiently and expensively and has created considerable distortions.

Pressure for a general extension of services has been met simplistically by price restrictions; no action has been taken in the area of management efficiency or the better use of resources, nor have users been made responsible for the costs and quality of the services they use.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PNV'S INTERNAL DEBATES COME TO A HEAD

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jan 80 p 24

[Text] The triple B for Arzallus--Marked by serious incidents and event physical encounters, the PNV's [Basque Nationalist Party] Biscay Assembly of elected Xabier Arzallus as president of the Bizcai Buru Batzar (the party's highest regional body). The elections provoked new tensions which became very heated with Arzallus' resignation from his seat in Parliament.

Fascists, traitors, supporters of Spain, were the mildest insults that could be heard on Saturday afternoon while the representatives of the municipal councils to Alder-di-Etxea were arriving in the Artea de Castillo Elejabetia district.

Former president Anton Ormaza's supporters gathered at an early hour and endeavored to block the entrance to the grounds of the former seminary (at present the PNV's house) coming up against Arzallus' supporters whom they compared with Franco. Days before the Assembly and seeing that his candidacy was in danger, Anton Ormaza--former president, who had given up and resigned, together with the previous BBB following the Assembly's agreement of 17 November--sent a letter to all of the members in which he criticized in violent terms deputy Arzallus, the one heading the list of the so-called renewal or parliamentary group.

"I must state," Ormaza wrote, "that it is absolutely intolerable and contrary to the spirit, philosophy and even the party's statutes that a parliamentarian should get into the party's internal political game."

These statements once again exposed the polemical subject of the incompatibilities between public and party offices, a controversy Arzallus appears now to have resolved by giving up his parliamentary seat. In this sphere, the executive body of Guipuzcoa, the province Arzallus represents, still has the last word. If the resignation were ratified, his position would be filled by Gerardo Bujana, a deputy in the previous legislature and at the top of the list the PNV presented of those who did not win a seat.

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In any event, the members of Parliament allege that in Arzallus' case the incompatibility argued by the Ormaza group does not exist in that Arzallus is a deputy for Guipuzcoa, a member of the party in Vizcaya and is on the Bilbao electoral rolls.

Aware that victory was slipping away from them, Ormaza's supporters in an unexpected press conference, announced 2 days before the Assembly's opening that they were withdrawing from it, although they hinted that in the event of being elected by the delegates "they would bear in mind the regulation establishing the compulsory aspect of accepting the positions."

Obedience Is There But Nothing Is Done

Twenty-four hours later the Ormaza group of the BBB that resigned announced in a communique the calling off of the Assembly meeting, refutation of the decision of the PNV's regional tribunal which had requested that the meeting be held--"obedience is there but nothing is done"--and the expulsion of five burukides (BBB members) who were supporters of Arzallus.

Inaki Anasagasti, one of those expelled, commented to CAMBIO 16: "This expulsion is totally invalid. Ormaza and his people have not only openly confronted the opposition group but also the party's executive body. They have cancelled the convocation of the Assembly because it was unfavorable to them. Our election was to the Assembly; consequently only the Assembly has the power to revoke it."

On Saturday, faced with Alderdi-Etxea, the accumulated tension turned into violent aggression. After being subjected to the worst insults for over an hour, a number of parliamentarians and leaders left the place with somber faces and a preoccupied look.

Arzallus, Marcos Vizcaya, Inigo Aguirre fled discreetly in a car. Inaki Anasagasti, jeered at, got into his at the moment stones were being thrown. Sabin Zubiri, after jumping out of a window, was greeted with blows from umbrellas, was pushed around and was barely able to escape.

However, and without the traditionalists noticing, a side door had remained unwatched and some 100 people, 21 representatives, representatives of various municipal assemblies, decided to hold the ceremony and, in conformity with the party's regulations, voted for the new BBB. Arzallus' candidacy was endorsed by the majority. On the following day another brawl at Artea, while just a few kilometers away at the Ceanuri professional training school, 112 representatives standing for 78 of the 103 municipal councils Vizcaya has, ratified Arzallus' election at the head of the BBB.

The triumph of the renewal group and the disappearance--with Arzallus' resignation of his seat--of one of the arguments brandished by the opposition group in order to impugn him, may cause serious problems within the party.

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The deep split that has appeared as a result of the confrontations over the weekend will doubtless be apt to have grave consequences.

Although the present leaders maintain that the crisis has made it possible to unmask those who have infiltrated and their allies from without, and that this will facilitate consolidation of the ranks, other groups fear that the quarrel may have caused a serious and incurable wound that may even give rise in the near future to a party split. In the meanwhile, this crisis in the key Basque political party is being followed with interest by Madrid.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PNV, PSOE (EUSKADI) AT ODDS OVER NAVARRE ISSUE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jan 80 pp 22, 23

[Text] The Socialist Party of Euskadi's secretary general took up his cane and came to blows with its left, Mario Onaindia of Euskadiko Ezquerria, and with its right, the PNV. He accused the former of demagoguery; the latter of conniving with terrorism.

It is political effrontery for Mario Onaindia (EIA's [Trade Union of Basque Students] secretary general, part of Euskadiko Ezquerria) to accuse the Socialist Party of giving carte blanche to the armed groups and to charge that we are making a stronger attempt on stability and democracy than those who defend terrorism." The harsh accusation against former ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] member Onaindia came in this instance from Txiki Benegas, secretary general of the Socialist Party of Euskadi and one of the few voices--outside of nationalists and traditionalists--to have an audience and he is listened with respect in the Basque country.

Txiki's words against Onaindia came after other statements made with equal harshness against the PNV as a result of this party's participation in the Euskadi general strike of last 7 December against the Workers' Statutes. Txiki's stand appears to respond to a new posture adopted by the Socialist Party in the face of the problems troubling the Basque people and which reflects great firmness and realism in the way of confronting them.

Still Navarre

The Onaindia-Benegas polemics apparently stemmed from one of the most burning issues of the whole Basque political process: the question of Navarre. As a consequence of a motion by the Labor Party submitted to the Navarre Parliament's Regulations Committee, proposing the integration of Navarre with Euskadi, from which the PSOE [Spanish Socialists Workers Party] abstained, Onaindia's charge, to which Benegas responded so offensively, cropped up. The PSOE, thanks to its votes and standing in Navarre, would in the future be in the privileged position of being able to tilt the balance towards integration or nonintegration given the UCD's [Democratic Center Union] and the Statutory Union of Navarre of Aizpun's overwhelming majority.

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"I think," Txiki Benegas pointed out to CAMBIO 16, "that both stands--that for integration and that against--are nationalist and extremely biased stands because they do not take into account what is going on among the people of Navarre. The Basque supporters of integration declare they are for Navarre's integration with Euskadi without further ado, without taking into account its status as a divided people. The PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] leaves this out of consideration, the only thing that matters to it is the integration of Navarre with Euskadi. And, on the other hand, the UCD maintains a stand which likewise impedes any solution. So anything that does not consist in seeking a way out of the present impasse is not a realistic or serious stand.

"We who are in the Second Congress of the Socialist Party of Euskadi," he added, "declare at the level of principles" that we are favorable to promoting the linking of Navarre with the rest of Euskadi. But a referendum at this time would be absurd given the visceral character of the stands taken and would give rise to a real war among the parties concerned--something that has already occurred at other stages in our history.

"So we believe," he went on, "that there is a way for collaboration between Navarre and Euskadi, that provided by the Guernica Statutes, which makes it easier to reach agreements, which may encourage the beginning of collaboration that may diminish the dramatic aspects of the present problem, that of the divided people of Navarre. Just as this must be done through a negotiated pact. The political parties of Navarre will have to sit down and negotiate a constitutional formula for the problem and not continue to divide the people of Navarre."

Replying at length to Onaindia on Navarre, Txiki emphasized that "if anyone knows about terrorism, destabilization, kidnappings--like that of Ruperez, the shooting of entrepreneurs in the knees, attempts against parliamentarians--as in the case of Gabriel Cisneros, revolutionary extortion and robberies, it is Onaindia and not the Socialist Party which does not and never will use violence."

The PNV Too

The PNV has also been the target of the Euskadi Socialists' secretary general. "At this time," he commented to CAMBIO 16, "the situation is a dramatic one for various reasons. Because of the terrorism and violence, the intolerance and aggressiveness under which Basque society is living. In the second place, because of the acutely serious economic crisis which the Basque country is going through that virtually no one is doing anything about at this time. And there is a third element, that of the parties' constant use of demagogy, and not only the minority ones but also others which should be setting an example of responsibility and restore the present situation by other courses of action.

"Within this context," Txiki Benegas noted, "the Workers Statute was developed. The PNV did not have major differences with the government's bill since in the working committee they only seven amendments while we presented about 400.

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"Thus: The one that merely because of its objection to Article 81 in its search for an autonomous framework for Euskadi labor relations, of a law still being negotiated and needed a plenary session for its passage, the one that just because of that, the PNV, went on strike in Euskadi, this seems to me a wicked act of irresponsibility, especially for a party that has more popular representation than any other. I feel that this irresponsibility and this demagoguery make solutions leading to normalization difficult.

"Concerning the strike," he remarked, "the Socialist Party of Euskadi has stood alone as it did on the constitution. I recall that during the referendum campaign the constitution was to everyone anti-Basque and centralist. Garaicoechea reached the point of saying that the treatment given the codes of law was more regressive than that under Franco. And yet under the constitution it has been possible to work out a statute such as that of Guernica. That is what I call irresponsibility."

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

CABINET CHANGES: MINISTERIAL JOB SECURITY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 Jan 80 pp 12-15

[Article by Jose Oneto: "The Dance of the Ministers"]

[Text] A new year; new ministers. Everyone is discussing the crisis; everyone claims that it is just around the corner. And, among the politicians, the "dance of the ministers" and the preparation of lists of candidates for ministries have begun.

"The presence of the committees representing our Armed Forces before the king on an occasion of such solemn tradition is vivid, emotional testimony of their unswerving allegiance to the Crown, of an enthusiastic allegiance to you personally and of their constant dedication to our nation, Spain."

The very brief remarks by the vice-president of the government, Lt Gen Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, at the Military New Year's ceremony, celebrated on Epiphany in the Throne Room of the Royal Palace in Madrid, sounded resolute. But there was something in the tone of voice and gestures, and in the brevity of the speech itself, which sounded like a farewell.

Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, 67 years of age, a lieutenant general in the Land Army, without whose aid the political transition in Spain would have been far more difficult, seemed to be ending a sad period of his life wherein, the victim of all kinds of misunderstanding, he had tried to expend all his efforts on the consolidation of democracy.

Hence, although the crisis which appeared to have been started 3 weeks ago by the president of the government, Adolfo Suarez, has not put an end to Gen Gutierrez Mellado, his work as head of the military vice-presidency seems to have ended, with the transfer of the control of the military establishment to a civilian: the minister of defense, Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun.

Now, with the elimination of the leadership of Gutierrez Mellado, who wanted to unite his destiny with that of the president of the government who appointed him, and for whom he did not hesitate to "burn himself,"

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politically and professionally, the direction of the rumored cabinet crisis, which was not resolved when this issue of CAMBIO 16 went to press, lies with Fernando Abril Martorell, aged 43 and second vice-president of the government, responsible for economic affairs and a man who has, likewise, not hesitated to "burn himself" to save Adolfo Suarez.

The Protagonist

Ten months ago, the protagonism of Fernando Abril Martorell, who gave Adolfo Suarez the first constitutional government virtually formed (the president made only slight changes), evoked certain suspicions in the "close circle" at Moncloa Palace.

Now, with Rodolfo Martin Villa and Francisco Fernandez Ordonez eliminated, the president of the government, who has become increasingly isolated, only trusts Fernando Abril, to the point where, according to a minister in the present government, it is quite difficult to ascertain where Adolfo Suarez' thinking ends and that of Fernando Abril begins.

A worker, intelligent, with a great capacity for analysis and a realistic view of the state, Fernando Abril has, up until now, been the one who always had to say "no," and the one who has had no qualms about confronting the other ministers, whom he has at times mistreated, without regard for his personal image or his future in the party.

Therefore, Abril has become the irreplaceable ally of a distrustful Suarez obsessed with conspiracies. And, therefore, according to all observers, Abril will again be the one who will have a decisive influence on the government that is formed now, or within 3 months, when the results of the elections for the Basque and Catalan parliaments are known.

With Gutierrez Mellado's departure and his subsequent transfer to Washington, where he will negotiate, as ambassador, several agreements with the United States which appear to be difficult and problematical owing to certain reservations expressed to Madrid already by the American ambassador, Todman, Abril's role assumes greater importance, particularly if he becomes the only vice-president of the government.

As single vice-president, Abril would be responsible for resolving all the political problems, many of which, though they are not in his field of competence, he has had to resolve when no one wanted to cope with them.

Those who think that they know Fernando Abril believe that, when he leaves the economic vice-presidency, there would be no need to appoint a substitute. A finance minister with authority within the economic group would be responsible for coordinating the ministers of commerce, industry and agriculture. According to this theory, taking control of expenditures is sufficient to win authority among the economic ministers.

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The Ranking

Moreover, if the government wants to maintain the present economic policy, it would be difficult to find a substitute who would want to carry out a policy that is not his own, even though it may be the only one that can be made in the current state of international crisis.

In an analysis that is as objective as possible, how does the present group of ministers appear?

After making numerous inquiries in political circles of the government and among the opposition, the following assessment could be made:

Joaquin Garrigues Walker

Assistant minister to the president of the government, a cabinet post created during the crisis in April. Despite all of Garrigues' efforts, Suarez has not given him authority; and hence his department has become a ministry without a mission. In any event, there is no indication that the president wants to dispense with a man who has lent intellectual loftiness and standing to the party and the government.

Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo

Minister for relations with the European Communities, he seems secure in his post, and he has sometimes been mentioned as an alternative to the president himself; because he would be well received by the Armed Forces and the big banks, and he would have international backing. He is a good negotiator, and it seems senseless to remove him in the middle of the negotiations with the European Community.

Rafael Arias Salgado y Montalvo

His work has been criticized at the head of the party in which he is still serving as secretary general. He seems to be trying to divide the cabinet post from his position in the party. Originating in the Social Democratic ranks, he maintains excellent relations with Fernando Abril and appears to be a possible member of the government.

Antonio Fontan Perez

Minister for territorial administration, he is in a weak and difficult position if the crisis proves to be maximum. Since his first attempts to deal with the Basque problem just after taking office (a leadership which was taken from him by Suarez himself), he has been systematically short-circuited. He lacks specific authority, and many ministers are of the opinion that nothing would be lost if even the ministry were abolished.

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Marcelino Oreja Aguirre

Minister of foreign affairs and among those with the greatest seniority seated at the Council of Ministers table. He is safe in his position despite the criticism that he has received from the opposition regarding alleged secret agreements with Morocco. Enjoying excellent relations with Adolfo Suarez (Suarez went so far as to tell a group including several newsmen: "He is the best minister of foreign affairs that Spain has had in recent years"), he is a suitable person for the personal international policy that is intended to be pursued by the Palace at Moncloa. There is no indication of an intention to replace him.

Jaime Lamo de Espinosa y Michels de Champourcin

Minister of agriculture, he has been criticized by several sectors of the party which accuse him of "statism," on account of the Law on Improvable Properties. A close friend of Fernando Abril, he has nevertheless had conflicts with the vice-president over the price of oil. He appears to be secure in his position, and there is even a possibility of his changing cabinet posts within a few months.

Jose Pedro Perez Llorca Rodrigo

Minister of the presidency and legal adviser to the president of the government, he is an ambitious and persevering man who has had conflicts with the vice-president of the government, Fernando Abril. He appears to be safe in his position if the crisis occurs minimally. He could be jeopardized within the next few months if there is a reinforcement of Fernando Abril's power, because the latter would prefer a minister of the presidency who was more closely associated with his positions. Although his dubious action in the Pejanaute case caused misgivings within the party (the Navarre affair), he managed to salvage the talks with the Basques for the ratification of the Statute of Euskadi.

Juan Antonio Garcia Diez

Minister of commerce, he has a chance of remaining in his position if there is no shakeup in the economic group. He has good relations with the vice-president, and is in perfect coordination with the Castellana 3 directives.

Manuel Clavero Arevalo

Minister of culture, he appears certain to be dismissed on all the lists and combinations. His fall into disgrace occurred not because of his incompetence as a minister, but because of the position that he assumed in Andalusia, where he promoted autonomy to preserve the party on the provincial level. His dubious status in the Andalusian affair is a result of the government's indecision regarding the process of autonomy. The downfall

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of Manuel Clavero, who has not spoken freely with the president for over 3 months, is the price that UCD [Democratic Center Union] will pay to PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] to demonstrate that there is an intention of "rationalizing" in the policy on the autonomous entities.

Agustin Rodríguez Sahagun

Minister of defense, he is the first civilian to hold this cabinet post, whose alternation was confirmed on Epiphany by the vice-president himself, Manuel Gutierrez Mellado. A tireless worker, after a few months of isolation, he has begun to have complete and timely information on the three branches of the armed forces. He is secure in his position, although he has been criticized for not having obtained financing from the Ministry of Finance for an extensive updating of the Armed Forces.

Jose Luis Leal Maldonado

Ministry of economy, he has been very dependent on the position of Fernando Abril as economic vice-president. Although some colleagues in the government accuse him of a lack of resolve, because of his ignorance of how the administration operates and the lack of a bureaucratic apparatus at his orders, he has good relations with the economic vice-president. It is thought that, in view of the possibility of a new appointment in the Ministry of Finance, so as to achieve coordination there in the economic group, the economy cabinet post may be abolished.

Jose Manuel Otero Novas

Minister of education, he has been unable to carry out all his plans, according to his collaborators, because of a lack of budget. However, his political status within the cabinet is so bad that he is already considered to be out of the government. A very strong advocate of private education, his tenure in the Ministry of Education has been beset with protests, some from sectors of the party that accuse him of being in the service of certain clerical positions.

Jaime Garcia Anoveros

Minister of finance, who has recently had some "differences" with the economic vice-president. He has tried to remain faithful to the tax reform started by his predecessor in the post, Fernandez Ordonez. In view of the possibility that Abril may come to occupy the single vice-presidency, he is not considered to have the authority to take charge of the economic group under the distant supervision of Abril. He is regarded as being in an unstable position, although it is impossible for his dismissal to be accompanied by that of Clavero, unless there is a desire to come in conflict with the UCD of Andalusia.

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Carlos Bustelo y Garcia del Real

Minister of industry, in a perfect position if no essential changes are made in the economic group. Although he has been accused of lack of authority in connection with the postponement of the construction on the nuclear powerplant at Valdecaballeros, in Extremadura (a conflict even backed by sectors of the government party), he is among the few ministers implementing a long term plan. He has good relations with Fernando Abril and with the president of the government, Adolfo Suarez.

Jesus Sancho Rof

Minister of public works and urbanism, he seems secure in his position despite the fact that the economic crisis is having a critical effect on the capacity for contracting. He has not distinguished himself for brilliance thus far, but has taken refuge in routine activity. He has the backing of Adolfo Suarez, although he is a member of Rodolfo Martin Villa's group.

Juan Rovira Tarazona

Minister of health and social security, he is safe in the position unless the revamping is very extensive and different agreements have to be made. He has carried out a plan which seemed impossible: control of the social security accounts. At present, he is in complete consensus with the PSOE on achieving a Health Reform Law that will have maximum support. It does not appear that he will be replaced in the midst of the reform work. In any event, he has some collaborators who have been harshly attacked by the PSOE.

Rafael Calvo Ortega

Minister of labor, he is in an excellent position owing to his good relations with Adolfo Suarez and Fernando Abril, and his success in the Worker's Statute. He is said to be the minister of finance chosen by Abril to coordinate the economic group. Certain sectors have been pressuring for him to become secretary general of the UCD, replacing Rafael Arias Salgado. However, this operation would meet with some opposition within the government ranks, because Rafael Calvo is an individual associated with Opus Dei through several of his collaborators.

Salvador Sanchez Teran

Minister of transportation and communications, he seems to be safe in his position despite the petition from the PSOE for his immediate dismissal because of the signing of a secret agreement with Morocco which would permit the passage through Spain of Moroccan oranges bound for the European Economic Community. Up until this incident, Sanchez Teran's performance surpassed that of the general average of ministers. He has excellent public relations which have succeeded in mitigating some of his failures.

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Inigo Cavero Latallaide

Minister of justice, he is insecure in the post, particularly because of the escape of the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group] "general staff" in December of last year. He attempted to blame the minister of interior, Antonio Ibanez Freire, for the escape, inasmuch as security outside of the jails is the responsibility of the latter. He has prepared a controversial Divorce Law which has been "challenged" in the ranks of the UCD itself. If the crisis is widespread, Cavero could be on the list of those leaving. In any event, his replacement poses a problem, since he would have to be replaced in that cabinet post by a Christian Democrat, or one of the latter would have to be assigned to another such post, to balance the influence of the original movements of the UCD.

Antonio Ibanez Freire

Minister of interior, criticized by the state security forces, he has the neutrality of the opposition, although in recent months his silence has been criticized by PSOE leaders. The deaths of two students in Madrid during December and his inability to transmit this information and that on the escape of the GRAPO members to the president of the government promptly have placed him in a difficult position. Despite the president's displeasure, it does not appear that Suarez intends to dismiss him soon. In any event, his downfall could occur in the second of the possible reshufflings. He has not shown his face in months.

Luis Gonzalez Seara

Minister of universities and research, he is experiencing a difficult situation owing to the "challenge" given to his Law on University Autonomy. Originating in the ranks of the Social Democrats, he intends to carry forward a law which could cause a change in the structures of Spanish universities, despite the opposition of sectors within his own party (the Christian Democratic sector and Opus Dei), and the Communist Party, which has attacked the law as a mere mobilizing strategy. However, he is secure in his position, although it is not out of the question that he might change cabinet posts if the president himself, Adolfo Suarez, makes an agreement with the sectors of the party opposed to the law and the staunch defenders of public financing for the private universities.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

EDITORIAL ON SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN SCORES PRESS BIAS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Jan 80 p 3

[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "One Finds Invasion Easier With Marx']

[Text] Just imagine the scandal that would have erupted in the West if Afghanistan had been invaded by the United States instead of by the Soviet Union? Right now television throughout the world would be showing pictures of the repression that descended upon the Afghan nationalists; LE MONDE would be outdoing itself with clever editorials in the purest Gaullist-Leninist style and you can imagine what Gramsci would do in this country: TVE [Spanish Television] madly denouncing the invasion, the old blue press [Movement-controlled press]--today blue and scarlet--would be taking up its long since sharpened battle-ax against the "perfidious Western democracies;" EL PAIS would be thundering and Carrillo would be crowning it with some inflammatory statement in Congress or even with a parade through the streets of various cities of the peninsula. We would probably have a special correspondent in the area and would give our readers a biased chronicle with the evil details of the perfidious adventure of a power that has once again destroyed the freedom of a small country. And this editorialist would be hesitating.

How lucky we were. Since the act of aggression was launched by the Eastern European power, the press could sleep in peace and Jan Gramsci recommended silence and going on tiptoe. Afghanistan is a remote country, small, half Moslem and half desert and just try and find out what is going on there. In any event, you will not find out what is going on there because TASS is not the UPI, Soviet television does not belong to odious private interests which, provided they get money for it, are able to report on everything that is going on and if any Western newsman tries to report from Afghanistan he may hesitate about it if he has the time to do so. It is easier to invade secretly.

Soviet troops landed in Afghanistan to overthrow a semi-Soviet semi-dictatorship and replace it with a multi-Soviet multidictatorship. That has no significance. It is just another little aberration on the holy path of the mistakes made by those who on this earth personify the messiahs of Marx. With a slight a posteriori self-criticism, this peca-dillo will go to sleep, the sleep of the just, along with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the glorious Moscow trials

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in the 1930's, the cult of personality and another 10 or 12 barbaric acts of the same ilk. While the class content continues to be favorable, these small irregularities have no importance and from the standpoint of doctrinal purity they really do not exist. Think less and read IZVESTIA more, sir.

Those of us who read IZVESTIA very poorly and who, for example, have had recent reports of the ups and downs of the Eastern European power during the whole period of the Macias dictatorship, those of us who still vividly remember the frustrated dream of the Czech Dubcek, those of us who applauded the downfall of the Somoza dictatorship, those of us who felt strong anger in the face of Pinochet destructive acts and still have not yet been able to shout loudly enough and give a name to the horrors that occurred in Cambodia and in Vietnam when the Americans left there, we cannot avoid our revulsion at this intellectual weakness of Europe. With Marx everything is a blessing and without Marx everything is oppression.

A hundred years after the prophet lived, when Marxism has already so deeply penetrated our culture that the keystone of Marxism is purely banal, when even Lopez Rodo himself was an important Marxist under Franco with his assertion that \$1,000 per capita meant freedom, those who quote the bearded man [Marx] to justify any form of oppression deserve to have their sleeves or their souls slashed [sic]. Are you determined to define yourself as a Marxist, young man? There must be a reason for it.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

PSOE TO BUY NEWSPAPER--The PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] is looking into the possibility of buying the Madrid morning paper EL IMPARCIAL. From what is known, banker Domingo Lopez, the paper's majority shareholder, has made a firm offer to the PSOE leaders. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 Jan 80 p 5] 8094

ETA SUSPECTS FREED--The political operation following the release of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] deputy and its secretary of international relations, Javier Ruperez, has increased to a rate of nine weekly arrests per week. All of the released prisoners were awaiting judgement and had not received any definite sentence. [Text] [Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 Jan 80 p 5] 8094

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

LABOR PARTY'S LEFT WINS STRUGGLE FOR PARTY INFLUENCE

LD241205 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 24 Jan 80 p 40 LD

[Elinor Goodman report: "Callaghan Fails Again on Party Inquiry"]

[Text] Mr James Callaghan's hopes of eroding the leftwing domination of the commission of inquiry into the future of the Labour Party were finally dashed yesterday. The party's National Executive voted by 12 to 11 in favour of retaining the existing membership of the commission. This means that the left will have a clear majority on the commission which will report to this year's party conference on almost all the fundamental issues facing the party, including the method of selecting a leader and of drawing up the party manifesto.

In a further blow to the moderates, the Executive also effectively voted against publishing the Underhill report on infiltration of the party by Trotskyists which has already been extensively leaked. Lord Underhill, the party's former national agent, has said he will publish it if the Executive does not. The only thing appearing to hold him back is whether the party's organisation committee will agree to consider formally his request for publication at its next meeting.

Mr Callaghan, who has suffered successive defeats by the Executive since the last general election, did not seem to be in a fighting mood yesterday. He was, however on the winning side in the vote on foreign affairs. A motion, which he supported, condemning Soviet aggression in Afghanistan but arguing against a boycott of the Olympic games was approved with only one vote against.

Mr Callaghan's failure to weaken the left's grip on the commission will disappoint many Labour MPS and must put a question mark over how much longer he is prepared to go on haggling with the left as party leader.

Originally the idea of a commission came from moderates within the party. It was seen as a way of defusing the left's demand for radical change. But the tactic has backfired.

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Right up to the last moment some members of the shadow Cabinet had been hoping that the Executive would give way to a request from trade unionists for a Labour victory that two left-wingers should lose their seats as voting members of the commission. But in the end the NEC agreed to stand by its original decision.

This means that the commission will be composed of five trade union representatives, five members of the Executive, Mr Callaghan and Mr Michael Foot, as party leader and deputy leader, Mr Alex Kitson, deputy party chairman, and Mr Norman Atkinson, party treasurer. The only concession is for the chief whip to sit in on the proceedings as a non-voting member.

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UNITED KINGDOM

UK JOURNALIST REVIEWS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES

LD301337 London THE FINANCIAL TIMES in English 30 Jan 80 p 18 LD

[Article by Jurek Martin: "American Foreign Policy Takes a Quantum Jump"]

[Text] A war tremor has been felt in the U.S. during the past couple of weeks, not an earthquake by any means and not one always easily detectable on the Richter scale.

The manifestations have been disparate. The Jingoistic cheers from members of Congress when President Carter told them in his State of the Union Message that the U.S. would defend, by force if necessary, the integrity of the Gulf and that he was proposing recommencing registration for national military service. Conversations of a colleague with a farmer in Iowa afraid for the future of the grandchildren (boys and girls) and with friends in New York, the latter perhaps overinfluenced by the hysterical treatment accorded international crisis in certain newspaper articles, the occasional worried article by normally pragmatic journalists even in normally sober newspapers, such as the LOS ANGELES TIMES. In a sense even the rallying round President Carter reflects this fear.

Some politicians have picked up the vibrations. Senator Edward Kennedy, his presidential ambitions suddenly clouded over by his defeat in last week's Iowa caucuses, thought the President was to blame. In what was for the senator a crucial speech on Monday at Georgetown University in Washington, in which he assailed the President from the left domestically and, at times, from the right in foreign policy, he wondered whether the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan really ranked with Berlin crises, the Korean War, the takeover of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Cuban missile confrontation and the Vietnam war as, in Mr Carter's words "The gravest threat to peace since World War II."

Caustically, Mr Kennedy commented in his frontal assault: "Exaggeration and hyperbole are the enemies of sensible foreign policy...exaggerated dangers and empty symbols will not resolve a foreign crisis...we cannot afford a foreign policy based on the pangs of unrequited love" (of Mr Carter for President Brezhnev).

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Similarly reeling from the aftermath of Iowa, Mr Ronald Reagan, no longer the overwhelming favourite to win the republican presidential nomination, sought to revive his fortunes by offering his audiences some traditional red meat. The U.S. he declared should forget about SALT I and SALT II and re-arm, vigorously. While Mr Kennedy criticised Mr Carter's alleged vacillations and misjudgments, Mr Reagan raised again the spectre of appeasement and likened the president's record to the tapping of Neville Chamberlain's umbrella on the cobblestones of Munich.

Interestingly, when the spectacular rhetoric and retrospective criticism are stripped away neither Mr Kennedy, Mr Reagan nor, come to that, anybody else has come forward with a substantially different forward-looking foreign policy prescription from that outlined by the President in his State of the Union Message last week. Senator Kennedy's six point programme--accompanied by the plea that detente must not be condemned to premature extinction--could have been written, with a few word changes here and there, in the White House. He was more insistent than the president in advocating that Iran's grievances against the Shah be given proper airing, but only in degree.

Indeed, from left and right of the political spectrum, there seems agreement on the new principles of American foreign policy; that national defence be enhanced (congress may even add to, rather than subtract from, the proposed \$15 billion real increase of defense spending proposed in next year's budget), that the Gulf, however its boundaries are defined, must be protected against Soviet uncursion. That the allies must hang together, not be hanged separately, and that the U.S. has been presented with a distinct opportunity to exploit, by assorted means, what it believes to have been Moscow's mistake of invading, Afghanistan.

Yet President Carter must know he is riding a tiger. His smashing victory in Iowa and the lead he is now given for the forthcoming primaries in New England, Mr Kennedy's home turf, are probably illusory indications of strength, reflecting public discontent with the Kennedy candidacy more than happiness with Mr Carter's performance as president. Some polls are beginning to show national impatience that after nearly three months 50 Americans are still being held in Tehran; and an apparently revived republican party is beginning to snap at the president's heels. It is, therefore, necessary, politically, for Mr Carter to retain the foreign policy initiative.

That will not be easy. The most obvious reading of the new direction in American foreign policy, apart from the explicitness of the warning to Moscow to keep its hands off the Gulf, is its very vagueness. It is a quantum leap for the U.S. to unfold its protective umbrella over the Gulf, as it has over Western Europe and Japan. But deliberately, for reasons of flexibility, the administration is not saying who is covered, or to what extent, or even by what; or what circumstances would have to prevail for that protection to become effective. This very flexibility may not satisfy either the domestic or foreign audience for very long.

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[LD301339] Perhaps even more clearly than in the State of the Union Message, the new doctrine was recently best spelled out in a newspaper interview given by Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, its principal architect. Although state department and other administration officials may hold the national security adviser in dubious regard, they do not dissent in substance from the arguments he puts forth.

For a start, he stresses that the U.S. does not envisage a relatively homogeneous NATO-like alliance in the Gulf region for South West Asia, the preferred description here. "We have to be sensitive," he said, "to the desire for independence and distinctive identity of some of the countries concerned--and also to the significant ideological differences among the countries. We are none the less prepared, recognising these nuances, to work to create a cooperative security framework for the region in a variety of ways."

Translated, this seems to mean, for example, that the U.S. is prepared to foster new relationships with nations like Libya and Iraq, with which it has tenuous ties, but no inherent quarrel, as well as with their ideological mirror image, Saudi Arabia, the security of whose ruling monarchy is of genuine concern to Washington. It means shoring up Pakistan (which Dr Brzezinski himself and the under secretary of state, Mr Warren Christopher will visit later this week) without alienating its traditional enemy, India (the target of a mission by a veteran diplomat, Mr Clark Clifford).

It means increased aid to Morocco, stepped up again only last week, to fight the POLISARIO guerrillas without giving offence to Algeria and thus jeopardising valuable western energy contracts. It means helping Turkey, whose new prime minister, Mr Suleyman Demirel, has, in his latest economic package, gone some way to meeting the demands of his Western creditors, without pushing Greece too far. It means closer ties with Somalia without sacrificing the possibility of some day coming to terms with its neighbour, Ethiopia. In each and every case, the balancing act will be difficult in some it may be impossible.

It also entails renewing commitments to America's strongest friends in the region--Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But there is a simultaneous recognition that a failure to overcome Israeli opposition to a resolution of the Palestinian problem and the status of Jerusalem could vitiate the whole effort.

There remains, too, the particular and still central problem of Iran. The U.S. has delayed implementing economic sanctions against Iran in the hope that Tehran will appreciate that the real threat to its integrity now emanates from the Soviet Union, not the West. There is guarded optimism that the victory in the Iranian presidential elections of Dr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who is seen here as a relative moderate, will increase the chances of an early release of the hostages in the U.S. embassy and that the Islamic summit in Islamabad will further push Iran in the direction of resolving the impasse with the U.S.

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But, as Dr Brzezinski acknowledged, nuances in the diplomatic approach are complex in the extreme. The second aspect of the new U.S. posture is equally problematical--the possible use of American military force and the circumstances in which it might be deployed.

A conscious omission from the state of the union message was any reference to what the U.S. would do if the stability of a country in the area was threatened by internal revolution rather than from outside. There have been reports that President Carter nearly referred to the oilfields of the Gulf, rather than to the Gulf itself, as being in the vital interests of the U.S. If true, that implies that, above all, the U.S. would not stand by and watch Saudi Arabia disintegrate, thus endangering western oil deliveries, but that has not been explicitly stated in so many words. Events in Iran demonstrated the inability of the U.S. to frustrate popularly supported revolution, though Saudi Arabia, it is widely acknowledged, should not be automatically identified as having similar internal problems to Iran.

[LD301341] Nevertheless, the stated intention to assert an American military presence in the area, perhaps even relatively unobtrusively, does constitute another quantum policy leap. The so-called Nixon Doctrine was designed to rely on regional powers with muscle to support the western cause. Iran was supposed to fill this role in the Gulf. That approach is now defunct and the onus now rests squarely on the American military, aided, of course, by the forces of friendly nations.

The vehicle of American power is to be President Carter's rapid deployment force. As the 1981 budget (year starting October, 1980) shows, this is now a central element in U.S. defence planning in the 1980s. But it is conceded that this 150,000 strong contingent, based in the U.S., Europe and the Far East and supported by a new generation of transport aircraft and support ships, is a good five years away from full scale disposition.

The U.S. is not exactly power-less in the interim, with two naval carrier task forces, equipped with substantial aerial firepower, already in the Arabian Sea; with two U.S.-based mobile divisions; and some battalions on standby in Europe and the Pacific. The U.S. is also seeking to negotiate air and sea based facilities that it can use in extreme need, though there is doubt whether that can be easily arranged, in Somalia, Oman and Kenya. In any event, present forces are limited in effect to quick strikes or temporary holding actions in conventional warfare.

The U.S. also does not want to be seen to be abandoning, at the drop of an Afghan hat, the human rights policies which, qualified or not in recent years, it still sees as a potent weapon in the ideological war with the Soviet Union. The internal exile imposed on Dr Andrei Sakharov, to whom, it will be recalled, President Carter sent a personal letter shortly after assuming office, does give the U.S. a further opportunity to present to the Third World at large, and the Gulf in particular, the contrast between American and Russian approach to human rights. But that, too, could be

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weakened if the U.S. is perceived as propping up unsavoury and already unstable right wing regimes merely in the interest of securing the West's oil lifeline.

But the subtle challenges of implementing the new policies have to be set in the more simplistic domestic context. The administration, for example, seems much more relaxed than the congress about the level of co-operation it is getting from the Western alliances in the cases of both Iran and Afghanistan. The Congress, on the verge of recommending that the U.S. boycott the summer olympics in Moscow, is likely to be incensed if France, West Germany, Japan or others fail to follow suit, apparently undermining the U.S. moral case.

The country is indeed in a strange mood: a once diffident President is talking tough and profiting politically from the conversion; his liberal opponent has taken to quoting Theodore Roosevelt, the "bully boy" President usually invoked by conservatives; an isolationist congress has turned interventionist; and war tremors have been felt.

In the process, such signals as are still emanating to Moscow that the U.S. does not want to embark on escalation of the arms race have got lost. It would probably be unwise to overestimate the depth and permanence of U.S. belligerence muscle-flexing may be popular now, but maybe not to the point of actually dispatching American troops once again to fight in some far-flung and little-understood corner of the world for a cause that seems obscure. President Carter himself clearly does not want to go so far, but has concluded, no matter how reluctantly, that the line had to be drawn somewhere.

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COUNTRY SECTION

UNITED KINGDOM

'THE GUARDIAN' URGES POLICY RETHINK IN WAKE OF AFGHAN EVENTS

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[Editorial: "The Serious Road From Afghanistan"]

[Excerpt] After Kabul, and with a watchful eye on Baluchistan, do we, the West, now seriously ponder the inevitability of war with Russia, a war that will leave both adversaries cinders? Some eager American commentators have that conflagration only a few twitches of a button away. Whilst Jimmy Carter and Margaret Thatcher reflect none of this passion for conflict, they are at the moment walking among the path to a global strategy which makes war (by accident rather than design) a greater probability. And this time--with Mr Enoch Powell in the house on Monday--it is worth pausing to reflect on reality and "the tissue of illusion."

Either the situation is deadly serious, or it is only half serious but all the more perilous for that. Presented with Afghanistan, America halts future grain supplies and some technological exports. It does not renege on existing contracts; it does not even refuse Russians entry to its own winter Olympics. Britain, though just as voluble, does even less. It cancels a defunct trade agreement; bans high-level visits which weren't scheduled in the first place; and reads an Olympic lesson. If this is truly "the dangerous decade," as Mrs Thatcher would have us believe, then the cosmetic and the puny will hardly rock Mr Brezhnev on his heels.

So far, as Mr Powell remarks, we have only had the tissue of illusion. What would be a serious response to a serious threat? The touchstone is not defence spending (a thousand billion dollars extra in America's case, a much debated 3 per cent on the mod budget in Mrs Thatcher's); it is, rather, an over-riding determination to shore up Western approaches both internally and externally. For America, there is energy policy--"the moral equivalent of war." Here Senator Kennedy, openly avowing a strict rationing system, is rather more courageous than a president who has quietly let the cutting edges of his policy soften. One may think price rises rather than ration books America's best route to loosening its craven dependence on the Gulf it intends to flood with warships: but Kennedy has grasped the moral equivalents whilst Mr Carter has grasped only the weapons of war. Meanwhile, in Britain, as the estimable Mr Peregrine Worsthorne points out, the shadow

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of conflict should surely steer a government towards policies of national reconciliation. Instead we have only Mr Biffen promising three truly appalling years. And in Europe the emergency is allegedly of such dimensions that relatively petty rows about budget contributions and lamb should be slipped, statesmanlike, into a pending tray whilst the vital business of concerting defence policy absorbs all energies. But, of course, reality is exactly to the contrary.

The openly debated prospect of World War III--if earnestly meant--should submerge all other issues. But it has not. The dilemma now for the West is not the formulation of policies which lead towards war, but the problem of catching our breath and concerting policies which knit the free world closer together whilst allowing a full and independent range of possibilities among the non-aligned.

Specifically (and by no means exhaustively) that should mean:

American action to restrain energy demand; British resolve to work more wholeheartedly within our European framework; a Western summit, or a series of summits if need be, to coordinate and espouse our common core of democratic beliefs; stemming from this, the development of true friendships in--and other, more limited attachments throughout--the Third World; urgent attention to the shrinking flow of world aid; urgent efforts, in the forgotten aftermath of Tokyo, to see whether the tantalising chimera of a global economic policy cannot be brought closer.

Such a programme may bring derisive laughter. But consider. The heart of the energy famine has got to be tackled sooner or later; this is sooner.

The Islamic world, as this week's conference demonstrates, has swung overwhelmingly against Russia; but, balancing, also overwhelmingly against Egypt, America's standard bearer. The West has to address itself to the problems of the West Bank if the isolation of Sadat is not to lead to his collapse; which means a new initiative. All Europe, by coincidence, shares a common line in the West Bank. Could we not make a start?

The shambles of Afghanistan, with fresh sanctions pouring from America at every press conference, and Germany, France and Japan struggling merely to keep abreast of the tide of information has not been a pretty or heartening sight. A summit is needed.

So, too, is a meaningful philosophy for friends and neighbours. Pakistan now stands uneasily on the brink of the Soviet world. It is reasonable for the West, if asked, to lend its support to Pakistan. But it is not reasonable (indeed, it is wholly self-defeating) to throw all our weight behind a wobbly, repressive military regime which, when it falls will set the American Embassy burning again. Nor is it sensible in the rush to reinforce General Zia, to forget the alarm across the war-scarred border of the world's largest democracy, India.

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As for aid and economic coordination, we see (Ted Heath sees, Willy Brandt sees) a growing gulf of poverty and frustration between the developed world and the rest. The rest of the world, examining America's defence budget, may draw bitter conclusions. You cannot eat missiles. You cannot educate your people with aircraft carriers. You cannot begin to lay the groundwork of stable, tolerant societies whilst your economy lurches at the triggering of Western inflation or Western interest rates. You cannot, like Turkey, struggle to preserve democracy when the pincers of the IMF close around you. Iran is a sign and a portent; there has to be a better way.

Such thoughts slowly surfacing in America and in Europe, are not the easy, first reaction to Afghanistan or, frankly, are they as simply accomplished as a mixture of rhetoric and rearmament. But (from Mr Brandt), Mr Heath and Mr Kennedy in their different ways) they begin to form the most profoundly serious and challenging pattern for the eighties. It will not be a pattern of weakness, for the obstacles are formidable; nor will it be a pattern guaranteeing success and survival. Not a tissue of illusion: but a chance to think again and think better.

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